Financial Repression Tracker
Idioma: Português

Repressão financeira por país

Repressão financeira são regras que direcionam a poupança para a dívida pública ou mantêm os rendimentos abaixo da inflação, permitindo que os governos tomem empréstimos mais baratos de seus próprios poupadores.

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Cada país coberto recebe uma cor conforme seu índice de repressão, de 0 (sem repressão financeira) a 100 (total), em intervalos de 10 pontos; os países em cinza ainda não são cobertos. Passe o cursor ou dê foco a um país para ver sua pontuação, ou selecione-o para ver suas medidas. A lista abaixo do mapa apresenta todas as pontuações.

Pular mapa
Índice de repressão
Sem repressãoTotal
Ainda não coberto

Jurisdições cobertas

Maiores índices primeiro. A perspectiva inclui leis já aprovadas que ainda não se aplicam.

  • Japão
    13 em vigor2 aprovadas
    64,9índice · perspectiva de 66,8
  • India
    17 em vigor
    60,6índice · perspectiva de 60,6
  • China
    18 em vigor
    59,5índice · perspectiva de 59,5
  • Turkey
    12 em vigor
    50,7índice · perspectiva de 50,7
  • Brazil
    14 em vigor1 aprovada
    49,9índice · perspectiva de 52,3
  • Reino Unido
    15 em vigor4 aprovadas
    44,4índice · perspectiva de 53,5
  • Egypt
    11 em vigor
    44,1índice · perspectiva de 44,1
  • União Europeia · 27 países
    11 em vigor2 aprovadas
    44,0índice · perspectiva de 47,0
  • Thailand
    12 em vigor
    43,6índice · perspectiva de 43,6
  • Estados Unidos
    15 em vigor1 aprovada
    42,9índice · perspectiva de 50,6
  • Argentina
    15 em vigor
    40,1índice · perspectiva de 40,1
  • Mexico
    11 em vigor
    32,5índice · perspectiva de 32,5
  • Canada
    10 em vigor1 aprovada
    31,3índice · perspectiva de 36,1
  • Russia
    11 em vigor2 aprovadas
    26,3índice · perspectiva de 27,9
  • Switzerland
    10 em vigor1 aprovada
    22,2índice · perspectiva de 24,6
  • Australia
    6 em vigor1 aprovada
    16,9índice · perspectiva de 20,1

Páginas de todos os países

Todos os 42 países cobertos pelo site, de A a Z, incluindo cada membro da UE.

Próximas alterações

Leis aprovadas que ainda não se aplicam e propostas, das mais recentes para as mais antigas.

Como o índice funciona

O índice vai de 0 a 100. Tem dois componentes: as regras em vigor no país (80% do índice) e o que seus mercados mostram (20%). Quando não temos dados de mercado de um país, o índice corresponde apenas à pontuação das regras.

Regras (80%)

Cada medida pertence a uma de nove categorias e tem intensidade de 1 (leve ou restrita) a 3 (forte e abrangente). Cada categoria pode acrescentar até um número fixo de pontos, de um total de 100 para o componente de regras. As categorias que mais diretamente obrigam a poupança a financiar a dívida pública têm maior peso:

CategoriaPontos
Demanda cativa16
Financiamento pelo banco central16
Controles de capitais16
Tetos de juros14
Viés prudencial favorável à dívida soberana10
Crédito direcionado10
Incentivos fiscais7
Restrições a ativos reais6
Tributos sobre transações5

Uma medida preenche parte de sua categoria: uma medida de intensidade 1 preenche 25%, de intensidade 2 preenche 50% e de intensidade 3 preenche 80%. Cada medida adicional preenche essa proporção do espaço ainda vazio. Assim, mais medidas sempre acrescentam algo, mas cada uma acrescenta menos: duas medidas de intensidade 3 preenchem 96%, não 160%. Uma categoria nunca ultrapassa seu limite de pontos. A cada medida é atribuída sua parcela dos pontos da categoria, de modo que os pontos das medidas na página de um país somam o componente de regras do índice.

Mercado (20%)

Dois indicadores, cada um com pontuação de 0 a 1; o componente de mercado é a média dos dois, multiplicada por 100 (ou apenas o indicador disponível, se houver somente um):

  • Taxa básica de juros real: taxa básica do banco central menos a inflação ao consumidor nos últimos doze meses (BIS), no mês mais recente com ambos os dados. +2% ou mais recebe pontuação 0; -5% ou menos recebe 1; entre esses limites, a pontuação varia linearmente. Se esse mês for de mais de 12 meses atrás, usamos a taxa de juros real do Banco Mundial, desde que não seja de mais de 2 anos atrás.
  • Detentores cativos: parcela da dívida pública detida pelo próprio banco central do país e pelos bancos nacionais (base de investidores em dívida soberana do FMI, trimestre mais recente). 0% recebe pontuação 0; 60% ou mais recebe 1.

O que entra no cálculo

O índice contabiliza medidas em vigor. A perspectiva também contabiliza medidas aprovadas: convertidas em lei e publicadas, mas aplicáveis a partir de uma data futura. Medidas propostas e em discussão aparecem como alterações futuras, mas nunca entram no cálculo, assim como as revogadas ou expiradas.

Os Estados-membros da UE estão sujeitos às medidas válidas em toda a UE, além das medidas nacionais. Os membros da área do euro também compartilham a taxa básica de juros real da área do euro (taxa do BCE menos a inflação da área do euro); os dados do FMI sobre os detentores da dívida não trazem um valor para a área do euro, por isso esse componente é omitido para esses países. Os membros da UE fora da área do euro ainda não têm dados de mercado no site, portanto seu índice corresponde apenas à pontuação das regras.

Todas as fontes foram abertas e seus números foram conferidos com os da medida. Cada medida também apresenta sua base legal: a lei, o regulamento ou a decisão oficial, com uma breve citação do texto oficial. As citações foram comparadas com a página por script quando possível; nos demais casos, um agente revisor independente as confirmou. As leis mudam, portanto confira o texto no link antes de se basear em uma entrada.

As nove categorias
Demanda cativa
Manutenção obrigatória de dívida pública por fundos de pensão, seguradoras ou bancos
Viés prudencial favorável à dívida soberana
Regras prudenciais que favorecem a dívida soberana (ponderações de risco zero, regras de reservas de liquidez, isenções no índice de alavancagem)
Tetos de juros
Tetos ou limites de juros sobre depósitos ou empréstimos e taxas de juros administradas
Financiamento pelo banco central
Compras de dívida pública pelo banco central, controle da curva de juros, financiamento monetário direto
Controles de capitais
Limites à transferência de dinheiro para o exterior, limites a investimentos no exterior, controles cambiais
Tributos sobre transações
Tributos sobre transações financeiras, impostos do selo e cobranças semelhantes sobre ativos não governamentais
Incentivos fiscais
Privilégios tributários para títulos públicos ou penalidades tributárias sobre ativos concorrentes
Crédito direcionado
Empréstimos direcionados pelo Estado, orientação do crédito e exigências de investimento no país ou em prioridades estatais
Restrições a ativos reais
Controles de aluguéis, restrições imobiliárias e limites à posse de ouro, dinheiro em espécie ou criptoativos

Leituras adicionais

  • The Coming Great Repression? New Measures and a Century of Evidence

    Bolhuis, Koosakul, Shenai, et al. · IMF, 2026

    Develops two measures from differences between captive and non-captive investors’ demand for government liabilities. Repression peaks after World War II, declines with liberalization and rises again after the global financial crisis, alongside weaker private credit and investment.

  • Expanding the Landscape of Cross-Border Flow Restrictions: Modern Tools and Historical Perspectives

    Bergant, Fernandez, Teoh, et al. · IMF, 2026

    Uses language models to code daily changes in legal cross-border restrictions from official documents dating back to the 1950s. The resulting measures distinguish direction, instrument and intensity, extending analysis beyond conventional capital-account controls.

  • The Sovereign-Bank Nexus in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies: Trends, Determinants, and Macrofinancial Implications

    Wezel, Barrail, Dehmej · IMF, 2026

    Documents stronger bank-sovereign links after COVID-19 but finds no broad evidence that financial repression explains them. Government refinancing needs are more strongly associated with banks’ sovereign holdings where state-owned banks have a substantial presence.

  • Financial engineering is no substitute for interest rates: Lessons from Türkiye

    Kara, Simsek · CEPR, 2026

    Examines Türkiye’s 2021–2023 combination of low policy rates, foreign-exchange intervention, protected deposits and financial restrictions. These measures temporarily stabilized deposits but shifted currency risk to the government, raising fiscal vulnerability and the eventual cost of policy normalization.

  • What about Japan?

    Chien, Cole, Lustig · Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2025

    The March 2025 revision examines how Japan’s public sector finances longer-duration risky assets with cheap, largely floating-rate liabilities. Falling real rates expand fiscal room but can disadvantage younger and less financially sophisticated households whose portfolios lack comparable duration.

  • Argentina: Request for an Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility—Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Supplement; and Statement by the Executive Director for Argentina (IMF Country Report No. 25/95)

    IMF staff · IMF, 2025

    The debt analysis attributes part of Argentina’s 2024 reduction in consolidated peso debt to financial repression, alongside recovering peso demand and changes in bank liquidity. It warns that easing exchange restrictions and changing debt composition will increase interest costs and require sustained fiscal adjustment.

  • ‘Muddling through or tunnelling through?’ UK monetary and fiscal exceptionalism and the Great Inflation

    Bordo, Bush, Thomas · Bank of England, 2025

    Reassesses British inflation through the interaction of fiscal policy, debt management and monetary institutions. Its historical account shows how efforts to fund government cheaply and limits on gilt sales pushed financing into the banking system, while later fiscal regime changes helped contain inflation.

  • Reassessing the fall in US public debt after World War II

    Acalin, Ball · CEPR, 2023

    Reassesses the US postwar debt decline by separating growth from primary surpluses, surprise inflation and the Federal Reserve’s wartime rate peg. It argues that growth alone explains much less debt reduction than commonly claimed and that repeating the historical interest-rate distortions would be difficult.

  • Up and away: Inflation and debt consolidation in historical perspective

    Esteves, Eichengreen · CEPR, 2022

    Studies historical debt consolidations and finds that high inflation often raises interest costs enough to erode its debt-reduction benefit. Successful consolidations were more concentrated in periods of low, stable inflation and credible fiscal and monetary policies.

  • The Aftermath of Debt Surges

    Kose, Ohnsorge, Reinhart, et al. · World Bank, 2021

    Reviews debt-reduction options after the pandemic, including inflation, repression, fiscal adjustment and restructuring. Repression can lower debt but diverts savings from productive uses, can be difficult to unwind and may be less effective with mobile foreign investors and marketable debt.

  • Interest Rate Repression: A New Database

    Calice, Diaz Kalan, Masetti · World Bank, 2020

    Provides survey-based data on interest-rate controls, their legal design and how tightly they constrain market rates. It connects these controls to other forms of repression and discusses their renewed relevance after the financial crisis and COVID-19.

  • Interest-Rate Liberalization and Capital Misallocations

    Liu, Wang, Xu · Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2020

    Shows that removing interest-rate restrictions can improve allocation within Chinese state-owned and private sectors while worsening allocation between them. In the calibrated model, liberalization can reduce welfare unless reforms also address state-owned firms’ advantages and private firms’ credit constraints.

  • Monetisation: Do not panic

    Pisani-Ferry, Blanchard · CEPR, 2020

    Argues, from the April 2020 perspective, that pandemic bond purchases did not themselves establish fiscal dominance or inevitable inflation. Whether central banks later raise rates and remunerate reserves matters more than the initial scale of purchases.

  • Eight centuries of global real interest rates, R-G, and the ‘suprasecular’ decline, 1311–2018

    Schmelzing · Bank of England, 2020

    Reconstructs a long-run decline in real interest rates across monetary and fiscal regimes. As a counterpoint to repression explanations, it suggests that low or negative real rates alone are insufficient evidence of deliberate government policies to suppress returns.

  • Financial Repression is Knocking at the Door, Again

    Jafarov, Maino, Pani · IMF, 2019

    Uses an updated interest-rate-control index to estimate the growth costs of financial repression. It finds that distorted price signals and investment allocation can materially reduce growth, qualifying arguments that cheap government funding is a low-cost debt remedy.

  • Macroprudential tools, capital controls, and the trilemma: Insights from the Bretton Woods era

    Monnet · CEPR, 2018

    Shows that Bretton Woods capital controls often made domestic credit controls effective rather than simply sustaining international interest-rate gaps. This cautions against measuring repression or monetary autonomy solely from observed interest-rate differentials.

  • The regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures - discussion paper

    Basel Committee on Banking Supervision · BIS, 2017

    Reviews preferential capital, concentration and liquidity treatment of sovereign exposures and how it can amplify bank-government risks. It presents possible reforms while recording that the Basel Committee had not reached agreement to change the rules.

  • Indian Financial Sector: Structure, Trends and Turns

    Mohan, Ray · IMF, 2017

    Traces India’s shift from state-directed finance toward gradual liberalization, including lower reserve and government-security requirements and the end of automatic deficit monetization. It finds substantial progress while noting continued public-bank dominance and remaining administered rates.

  • Financial Regulation and Government Revenue: The Effects of a Policy Change in Ethiopia

    Limodio, Strobbe · World Bank, 2016

    Uses an unexpected Ethiopian requirement to buy low-yield central-bank bills to measure government financing gains directly. The gains primarily came through reduced bank profits, with no detectable pass-through to borrowers or depositors in this case.

  • Financial Repression: Evidence and Theory

    Chari, Dovis, Kehoe · Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2016

    Explains how compulsory bank holdings can strengthen a government’s commitment to repay by making default more costly. The model supports repression only under urgent financing needs and weak repayment credibility, because the benefit comes at the expense of productive private investment.

  • The Political Origin of Home Bias: the case of Europe

    De Marco, Macchiavelli · Federal Reserve Board, 2016

    Finds that government-owned banks and banks with politicians on their boards held more domestic sovereign debt during the euro-area crisis. Government-owned banks increased this bias during stress, including after recapitalization, supporting a political-pressure explanation for some holdings.

  • The Liquidation of Government Debt

    Reinhart, Sbrancia · IMF, 2015

    Reconstructs government debt portfolios to measure the transfer from savers to governments when controlled interest rates combine with inflation. It finds substantial postwar debt liquidation and explains why high debt after the global financial crisis could revive these policies.

  • Capital control measures: A new dataset

    Uribe, Schindler, Klein, et al. · CEPR, 2015

    Explains how to construct separate legal capital-control indices by asset type and direction of flow using the IMF’s AREAER. The disaggregation distinguishes persistent restrictions from episodic interventions, which helps identify restrictions capable of keeping savings captive.

  • Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt

    Arslanalp, Tsuda · IMF, 2014

    Extends sovereign investor-base measurement to emerging markets, separating domestic banks, nonbanks and central banks from foreign holders. It documents post-crisis foreign inflows and country differences in banks’ government-debt exposure, useful for evaluating funding dependence and potential captive demand.

  • Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt

    Arslanalp, Tsuda · IMF, 2012

    Builds comparable sovereign-debt holdings by investor group and introduces indicators of exposure to investor withdrawals. It documents increased bank exposure to home-country government debt after 2008, providing data for studying captive demand without assuming every domestic holding is coerced.

  • Financial repression: Then and now

    Reinhart, Kirkegaard · CEPR, 2012

    Documents the post-2008 return of negative real rates and policies that encourage domestic institutions to absorb public debt. The authors interpret preferential regulatory treatment, pension restrictions and deposit-rate limits as possible modern forms of repression.

  • Interest Rate Liberalization in China

    Feyzioglu, Porter, Takáts · IMF, 2009

    Identifies the deposit-rate ceiling as China’s most binding interest-rate restriction and models its removal. Liberalization can improve credit allocation and monetary transmission, but successful implementation also requires stronger supervision and governance.

  • A New Database of Financial Reforms

    Abiad, Detragiache, Tressel · IMF, 2008

    Introduces a graded financial-reform index that records policy reversals as well as liberalization. Its dimensions help distinguish interest-rate restrictions, directed credit, reserve requirements and other regulatory constraints instead of treating repression as a single binary condition.

  • Financial Repression and Exchange Rate Management in Developing Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence for India

    Kohli, Kletzer · IMF, 2001

    Models how repression generates fiscal revenue and helps manage an exchange rate under capital controls. India’s experience around the 1991 devaluation shows how dependence on implicit financial taxation complicates liberalization and exchange-rate adjustment.

Medidas em 2026-10-14.