Steer · Captive demand
Forced placement of provident-fund and social-security reserves in government debt
- What it is
- Statutory or administrative rules requiring national provident funds or public pension reserves to be invested in (or deposited with) the government, through special non-marketable securities, minimum shares of government bonds, or mandatory deposits with a Treasury fund bureau.
- Why it counts
- Compulsory retirement contributions become a large, permanent and price-insensitive source of state financing, with members credited an administered rate rather than a market return.
When it was in force
- Singapore: 2014 → now, in force; the rule may be older than the cited document
- Malaysia: 2000, historical; the rule may be older than the cited document; its end is not documented
- Japan: 2001, historical; the rule may be older than the cited document
3 examples
Singapore
2014 → nowIn forceThe rule may be older than the cited document · As cited: current
CPF monies are invested by the CPF Board in Special Singapore Government Securities issued specially by the Government to the Board; the proceeds are pooled with other government funds and invested by GIC.
Investment of Central Provident Fund monies in Special Singapore Government Securities (SSGS) issued specially to the CPF BoardPrimary source
“CPF monies are invested by the CPF Board (CPFB) in Special Singapore Government Securities (SSGS). SSGS are issued specially by the Government to CPFB.”
Malaysia
2000HistoricalThe rule may be older than the cited document · Its end is not documented · As cited: historical rule; floor progressively lowered from the 2000s (per DG Trésor, 2018)
The EPF's rules required 70% of total investment to be in government securities, a floor progressively lowered with government agreement as the state's borrowing needs fell in the 2000s.
EPF management rules requiring 70% of total investment in public securities (as described by the French Treasury, June 2018)Secondary source
“70% du total investi doit l’être en titres publics. Cependant, du fait de la diminution du besoin de financement de l’Etat dans les années 2000, ce plafond a été progressivement abaissé”
Japan
2001HistoricalThe rule may be older than the cited document · As cited: until fiscal 2001 (Heisei 13)
Public pension reserve funds had to be deposited in full with the Finance Ministry's Trust Fund Bureau, which used them for the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program; the obligation was abolished in fiscal 2001 in favour of market-issued FILP bonds (JGBs).
Japan today: index 64.9Trust Fund Bureau Fund Act (資金運用部資金法): mandatory full deposit of public pension reserves (and postal savings) with the Ministry of Finance Trust Fund Bureau, abolished by the fiscal 2001 FILP reformPrimary source
“財政投融資の資金調達のあり方を、郵便貯金、年金積立金の全額義務預託から、財投債(国債)の発行中心に大転換すること”
Examples and their dates reviewed .
More captive demand
Further reading
- The Coming Great Repression? New Measures and a Century of Evidence
- The Sovereign-Bank Nexus in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies: Trends, Determinants, and Macrofinancial Implications
- Financial engineering is no substitute for interest rates: Lessons from Türkiye
- ‘Muddling through or tunnelling through?’ UK monetary and fiscal exceptionalism and the Great Inflation
12 more on captive demand
- The Aftermath of Debt Surges
- The regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures - discussion paper
- Indian Financial Sector: Structure, Trends and Turns
- Financial Regulation and Government Revenue: The Effects of a Policy Change in Ethiopia
- Financial Repression: Evidence and Theory
- The Political Origin of Home Bias: the case of Europe
- The Liquidation of Government Debt
- Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt
- Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt
- Financial repression: Then and now
- A New Database of Financial Reforms
- Financial Repression and Exchange Rate Management in Developing Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence for India