Steer · Captive demand
Mandatory deposits with the Treasury ('circuit du Trésor')
- What it is
- Arrangements under which public and para-public bodies, postal giro systems and other 'Treasury correspondents' must keep their liquid funds on deposit with the Treasury itself, so that deposit growth in the system automatically finances the state.
- Why it counts
- Money held in captive deposit circuits becomes zero- or low-cost sight borrowing for the Treasury, covering deficits 'automatically' without market issuance or central-bank advances.
When it was in force
- France: 1944 → 1965, historical; its end is not documented
- France: 1995 → 1997, historical; the rule may be older than the cited document; its end is not documented
- Italy: 1984 → now, in force
3 examples
France
1944 → 1965HistoricalIts end is not documented · As cited: 1944 to mid-1960s; dismantled progressively from the 1960s
Sociologist Benjamin Lemoine describes how the Treasury correspondents' deposits gave the Treasury 'spontaneous resources' from 1944 to the mid-1960s, so that monetary growth automatically enlarged Treasury resources and made bond issuance secondary.
France today: index 54.6The 'circuit du Trésor': deposits of the 'correspondants du Trésor' (Caisse des dépôts, savings banks, Crédit agricole, specialised lenders, and public bodies and local authorities whose cash was legally managed by the State)Secondary source
“plus la masse monétaire augmente, plus les correspondants du Trésor ont potentiellement de liquidités à déposer au Trésor, et plus le Trésor dispose de ressources”
France
1995 → 1997HistoricalThe rule may be older than the cited document · Its end is not documented · As cited: 1995-1997 (plan contract described)
Balances on postal cheque accounts were deposited with the Treasury, with La Poste paid a formula rate (13-week BTF minus 0.4%, floored at 4.75% and capped at 6.5%).
France today: index 54.6Contrat de plan État-La Poste 1995-1997: remuneration of postal current account (CCP) funds deposited with the TreasuryPrimary source
“Le contrat de plan entre l'Etat et la Poste pour 1995-1997 a prévu que la rémunération des fonds des CCP déposés au Trésor serait fixée par référence au taux du marché.”
Italy
1984 → nowIn forceAs cited: 1984-present (as amended)
Public bodies listed in Table A must hold their own revenues in interest-bearing special accounts, and other revenues (including loan proceeds) in non-interest-bearing accounts, at the provincial sections of the State treasury.
Italy today: index 49.2Legge 29 ottobre 1984, n. 720, Istituzione del sistema di tesoreria unica per enti ed organismi pubblici, art. 1Primary source
“devono essere versate in contabilità speciale fruttifera presso le sezioni di tesoreria provinciale dello Stato. Le altre entrate, comprese quelle provenienti da mutui, devono affluire in contabilità speciale infruttifera”
Examples and their dates reviewed .
More captive demand
Further reading
- The Coming Great Repression? New Measures and a Century of Evidence
- The Sovereign-Bank Nexus in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies: Trends, Determinants, and Macrofinancial Implications
- Financial engineering is no substitute for interest rates: Lessons from Türkiye
- ‘Muddling through or tunnelling through?’ UK monetary and fiscal exceptionalism and the Great Inflation
12 more on captive demand
- The Aftermath of Debt Surges
- The regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures - discussion paper
- Indian Financial Sector: Structure, Trends and Turns
- Financial Regulation and Government Revenue: The Effects of a Policy Change in Ethiopia
- Financial Repression: Evidence and Theory
- The Political Origin of Home Bias: the case of Europe
- The Liquidation of Government Debt
- Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt
- Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt
- Financial repression: Then and now
- A New Database of Financial Reforms
- Financial Repression and Exchange Rate Management in Developing Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence for India