Financial Repression Tracker

Rules that steer savings into government debt or hold returns below inflation, country by country.

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Japan

The Bank of Japan still holds close to half of all JGBs after a decade of yield curve control and negative rates, which ended in March 2024, and it is shrinking purchases only slowly while keeping its policy rate at 1.25 percent. Public pension money, a state postal bank, bank capital and liquidity rules that favor JGBs, and a large bond-funded state lending program add structural demand for government debt.

Repression index
64.9 / 100
Once enacted laws apply
66.8 (+1.9)
  • 13 in force
  • 2 enacted
  • 1 proposed or under discussion

Measures as of

How the index is built

Each segment is what one category of rules, or the market pillar, adds to the index. The full bar is 100.

  • Captive demand 10.4
  • Central bank financing 10.2
  • Capital controls 9.6
  • Rate caps 5.6
  • Prudential sovereign bias 5.0
  • Directed credit 4.0
  • Tax incentives 4.8
  • Real asset restrictions 1.2
  • Transaction taxes 0.0
  • Market pillar 14.1

Index = 80% × rules (63.5) + 20% × market (70.7) = 64.9

The method in plain words
  • Rules pillar (0–100). Each of the 9 categories can add up to its weight (the weights sum to 100). A category's intensity grows with every in-force measure in it: one measure counts by its severity factor (0.25 for severity 1, 0.5 for 2, 0.8 for 3), and each further measure closes part of the remaining gap, so breadth adds with diminishing returns: two severity-3 measures give 96%.
  • Market pillar (0–100). The average of the market readings below: how negative the real policy rate is, and how much of the government's debt is held by its own central bank and banks.
  • Index. 80% rules + 20% market when market data exists, otherwise rules alone. Laws passed but not yet applying count only in the outlook; proposals never count.

The 9 categories

Weight = the most points a category can add to the rules pillar. Intensity = how much of that weight the in-force measures fill. Open a category to see the measures counted; “What is this?” shows the instruments behind it, worldwide and in history.

  • 1 proposed not countedWeight 16Intensity 81%Points 10.4

    Mandated holdings of government debt by pension funds, insurers or banks. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 80%Points 10.2

    Central bank purchases of government debt, yield curve control, direct monetary financing. What is this? →

  • 1 enacted not countedWeight 16Intensity 75%Points 9.6 → 11.2 once enacted laws apply

    Limits on moving money abroad, outbound investment limits, FX controls. What is this? →

  • Weight 14Intensity 50%Points 5.6

    Caps or ceilings on deposit or lending rates, and administered interest rates. What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 63%Points 5.0

    Prudential rules that favor sovereign debt (zero risk weights, liquidity-buffer rules, leverage-ratio exemptions). What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 50%Points 4.0

    State-directed lending, credit guidance, and mandates to invest domestically or in state priorities. What is this? →

  • 1 enacted not countedWeight 7Intensity 85%Points 4.8 → 5.0 once enacted laws apply

    Tax privileges for government bonds, or tax penalties on competing assets. What is this? →

  • Weight 6Intensity 25%Points 1.2

    Rent controls, property curbs, and limits on owning gold, cash or crypto. What is this? →

  • Transaction taxesWeight 5Intensity 0%Points 0.0

    Financial transaction taxes, stamp duties and similar levies on non-government assets. No in-force measures here. What is this? →

Market pillar 70.7 / 100

The average of the readings that have data, worth 20% of the index (14.1 points here).

Indicators

Measured data from international sources, alongside the rules above. Real rates below zero mean savers lose purchasing power.

Real policy rate
-0.9%
Jul 2026
Government debt
205% of GDP
2025
Liquidation effect (est.)
2.6% of GDP
a year, at the 12-month real rate
Debt held by central bank
41.9%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic banks
18.3%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic non-banks
25.2%
Q4 2025
Debt held by foreign holders
14.6%
Q4 2025
Capital account openness
1.00 of 1
2023

Policy rate, inflation and real rate

Negative real rates-6-4-20246200520102015202020251.91.3-0.9

Who holds government debt

010203040502005201020152020202541.925.218.314.6

The liquidation effect follows Reinhart and Sbrancia: with a negative real rate, about −(real rate × debt) of GDP moves from savers to the state each year. It uses the policy rate, so treat it as a rough guide. Sources: BIS, BIS central bank policy rates; BIS consumer prices; IMF, IMF DataMapper: World Economic Outlook (October 2026); Fiscal Monitor (October 2026); Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito, The Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN): a de jure measure of financial openness; IMF, Sovereign Debt Investor Base for Advanced Economies / for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda).

Measures

Every measure tracked here, with its legal basis and sources. Only in-force measures count in the index.

In force (13)

  • Administered policy rate kept below inflation-neutral levels

    In force
    Since
    Sep 24, 2026
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 5.6 points to the index

    The Bank of Japan guides the overnight call rate to around 1.25 percent and pays 1.25 percent on banks' current account balances above required reserves, effective 24 September 2026. The Bank states that real interest rates remain low and financial conditions accommodative.

    Why it counts: With the policy rate set below underlying inflation of close to 2 percent, deposit and short-term bond yields stay low in real terms, eroding savers' returns while lowering the cost of servicing public debt.

  • Economic value-based solvency ratio for insurers

    In force
    Since
    Mar 31, 2026
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.5 points to the index

    From the fiscal year ending 31 March 2026, insurers must meet an economic value-based solvency ratio of at least 100 percent, replacing the old solvency margin ratio. Assets and liabilities are valued on a market-consistent basis, so interest-rate mismatches now cost capital.

    Why it counts: Life insurers with long-dated liabilities reduce capital charges by lengthening asset duration, and in yen the main long-duration asset is super-long JGBs.

  • Public pension reserve fund target allocation to domestic bonds

    In force
    Since
    Apr 1, 2025
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.3 points to the index

    The Government Pension Investment Fund's policy asset mix for fiscal 2025 to 2029, effective 1 April 2025, sets a 25 percent target for domestic bonds with a deviation limit of plus or minus 6 percent. Public pensions held 76.6 trillion yen of JGBs in June 2026.

    Why it counts: A state-set allocation keeps a quarter of the world's largest pension reserve in domestic bonds, mostly JGBs, giving the government a large and stable buyer.

  • Bank of Japan JGB holdings and slow purchase taper

    In force
    Since
    Jul 31, 2024
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Adds 10.2 points to the index

    The Bank of Japan held 470.0 trillion yen of JGBs in June 2026, 46.7 percent of the total. Under its June 2026 plan it cuts monthly purchases by about 200 billion yen a quarter to about 2 trillion yen from April 2027, and it can step up purchases or run fixed-rate operations if long-term rates rise rapidly.

    Why it counts: The central bank absorbs a large share of government debt and stands ready to cap sharp rises in yields, which keeps long-term borrowing costs, and the returns savers earn on bonds, lower than a free market would set.

  • Stablecoins limited to banks, fund transfer firms and trust companies; reserves in deposits and JGBs

    In force
    Since
    Jun 1, 2023
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.3 points to the index

    Under the 2022 amendment to the Payment Services Act, in force since 1 June 2023, fiat-backed 'electronic payment instruments' may be issued only by banks, registered fund transfer service providers or trust companies, and intermediaries need registration. Trust-type stablecoins originally had to keep all backing money in demand deposits; from 1 June 2026 the 2025 amendment lets up to 50% of the issued amount be invested in JGBs and time deposits without principal loss. The first yen stablecoin, JPYC, was issued in October 2025 by a registered fund transfer service provider.

    Why it counts: Stablecoin reserves have to sit in Japanese bank deposits or, up to a cap, in Japanese government bonds, so growth in yen stablecoins becomes new demand for bank funding and JGBs rather than a way around them.

  • Foreign stablecoins: equivalence test and holding/transfer cap at type-2 fund transfer level

    In force
    Since
    Jun 1, 2023
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.8 points to the index

    Registered electronic payment instrument intermediaries may handle foreign-issued stablecoins (e.g. USDC) only if the issuer is licensed and supervised under equivalent foreign law, reserves are held and audited under equivalent rules, and the issuer can freeze transactions linked to crime. For such foreign stablecoins the intermediary must keep the amount it holds and transfers for each user at the same level as for stablecoins issued by type-2 fund transfer firms, whose transfers are capped at 1 million yen.

    Why it counts: Residents can hold and move dollar stablecoins through domestic intermediaries only in small amounts, so foreign stablecoins cannot work as a large-scale way out of yen deposits.

  • Crypto investment trusts and ETFs blocked; planned opening tied to the FIEA reform

    In force
    Since
    Dec 27, 2019
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.2 points to the index

    Japanese investment trusts are meant to invest mainly in 'specified assets', and crypto is not one. On 27 December 2019 the FSA amended its supervisory guidelines to say that creating or selling investment trusts whose investment target is non-specified assets is not appropriate, citing the view that crypto investment encourages speculation. In its responses to public comments the FSA said crypto ETFs that are investment trusts can no longer be created or sold in Japan, and funds investing in foreign crypto ETFs are generally caught too. The FY2026 tax reform outline assumes a planned amendment to the Investment Trust Act Enforcement Order that would bring investment trusts investing in specified crypto assets under the 20% securities tax; that amendment has not been made.

    Why it counts: Savers cannot reach bitcoin through ordinary brokerage, NISA or investment trust channels. They must use direct crypto accounts, where gains are taxed as miscellaneous income at progressive rates until the separate taxation applies.

  • Japan Post Bank: capped postal deposits invested in JGBs

    In force
    Since
    Apr 1, 2019
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.8 points to the index

    Japan Post Bank's deposit limits are set by Cabinet Ordinance under the Postal Service Privatization Act, currently 13 million yen each for ordinary and time deposits. At 31 March 2026, at fair value, it held 26.5 trillion yen of held-to-maturity JGBs and 10.6 trillion yen of available-for-sale JGBs, against loans of 4.2 trillion yen.

    Why it counts: A state-group bank gathers household savings under government-set rules and, with little lending, channels a large part of them into government bonds.

  • Crypto gains taxed as miscellaneous income at progressive rates (national 5-45% plus 10% resident tax)

    In force
    Since
    Dec 1, 2017
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Adds 4.0 points to the index

    The National Tax Agency treats profits from selling or using crypto assets as miscellaneous income, as a rule (business income if annual crypto revenue exceeds 3 million yen and books are kept). This income is added to wages and other income and taxed at national income tax rates of 5% to 45% plus a 10% resident tax (4% prefectural, 6% municipal), with the 2.1% reconstruction surtax on the national tax on top. Losses on crypto cannot be set against other income, and crypto margin trading is excluded from the separate taxation that applies to FX.

    Why it counts: Holding bitcoin or other crypto instead of yen deposits or JGBs means high-income savers face the top progressive income tax rates on any gain, and losses cannot be set against other income.

  • Crypto exchange registration and ban on unregistered foreign exchanges soliciting residents

    In force
    Since
    Apr 1, 2017
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.8 points to the index

    Since 1 April 2017, only firms registered with the Prime Minister (FSA) may run a crypto-asset exchange business, and an unregistered foreign exchange may not solicit anyone in Japan. The FSA publishes warning letters against offshore platforms serving Japanese residents (e.g. Bybit, MEXC, Bitget, KuCoin, Binance), and in February 2025 it reportedly asked Apple and Google to remove five such apps from the Japanese app stores.

    Why it counts: Residents are confined to a small set of domestic licensed exchanges with limited token listings, and the FSA cuts off access to large offshore venues. This narrows the ways savers can move money out of the yen banking system into crypto held abroad.

  • Zero risk weight and Level 1 liquidity status for yen JGBs

    In force
    Since
    Mar 31, 2015
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 3.5 points to the index

    The FSA applies the national discretion of a 0 percent risk weight to yen-denominated Japanese government bonds, and they count as Level 1 high-quality liquid assets under the liquidity coverage ratio rules that took effect on 31 March 2015.

    Why it counts: Banks can hold JGBs with no capital charge and use them to meet liquidity requirements, which builds steady regulatory demand for government debt.

  • Tax-free interest on small public bond holdings (Tokubetsu-Maruyu)

    In force
    Since
    Jan 1, 2006
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.7 points to the index

    Under the Tokubetsu-Maruyu scheme, people with disabilities and certain other eligible persons receive JGB and local bond interest tax-free on up to 3.5 million yen of face value. Other interest is taxed at 20 percent plus surtaxes.

    Why it counts: A dedicated tax exemption for public bonds, separate from the deposit allowance, tilts eligible savers toward government debt.

  • Fiscal Investment and Loan Program funded by FILP bonds

    In force
    Since
    Apr 2001
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.0 points to the index

    The government lends to and invests in policy institutions through the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program, financed mainly by FILP bonds, a type of government bond. The FY2026 plan totals 19.0 trillion yen, up 6.8 trillion yen, to support the Japan-U.S. Strategic Investment Initiative, AI, semiconductors and other priority sectors.

    Why it counts: The state allocates a large pool of credit to its own priorities at government borrowing cost, crowding out market lending and adding to government bond supply that captive buyers absorb.

Enacted, not yet in force (2)

  • Crypto moved under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act (insider trading, void unregistered sales)

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Jul 23, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 3.7 points once it applies

    The amendment to the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act and Payment Services Act (Act No. 64 of 2026, passed 15 July 2026, promulgated 23 July 2026) moves crypto trading regulation from the Payment Services Act to the FIEA. Crypto dealing, offerings and lending become financial instruments business, insider-trading and market-abuse rules apply to crypto, dealers must not handle crypto that fails standards needed for the public interest and investor protection, and sales by unregistered operators of crypto that no registered dealer handles are void as a rule. The penalty for unregistered business rises to up to 10 years' imprisonment and/or a 10 million yen fine. It is not yet in force: the crypto provisions take effect on a date set by Cabinet Order within one year of promulgation (so by July 2027).

    Why it counts: Making contracts with unregistered (mostly offshore) operators void and raising criminal penalties tightens the domestic-only channel for buying crypto. Listing standards limit which tokens residents can buy through licensed dealers.

  • 20% separate taxation limited to 'specified crypto assets' sold through registered dealers

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Mar 31, 2026
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 0.7 points once it applies

    The FY2026 tax reform, enacted as Act No. 12 of 2026 (passed and promulgated on 31 March 2026), creates separate taxation at 20% (15% national income tax, 5% resident tax) for gains on 'specified crypto assets' (crypto whose name is entered in the FIEA dealer register) sold to or through a registered crypto-asset dealer, with a 3-year loss carry-forward against such gains. Dealers must report each customer's name, address, My Number and the crypto traded to the tax office by 31 January of the following year. It is not yet in force: the 20% rate applies to sales from 1 January of the year after the FIEA amendment (Act No. 64 of 2026, promulgated 23 July 2026) takes effect, on a date set by Cabinet Order within one year of promulgation, so 1 January 2027 or 1 January 2028; dealer reporting starts one year later. Crypto outside this scope stays under progressive comprehensive taxation, without the special deduction or the half-inclusion for assets held over five years, and its losses cannot be set against other income.

    Why it counts: The lower rate applies only to tokens and trades inside the domestic registered-dealer channel, which reports every trade with the holder's My Number. Self-custodied, foreign-platform or unregistered tokens keep the high progressive rate under tighter rules, which steers savers into a fully reported domestic channel.

Under discussion (1)

  • Bank of Japan CBDC: no issuance plan, holding limits and remuneration under study

    Under discussion
    Since
    Oct 9, 2020
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    In its October 2020 approach paper the Bank of Japan said it had no plan to issue a CBDC for now, and it has since moved from experiments to a pilot programme (since April 2023), with a progress report in June 2026 that says its design work does not fix the design for any actual rollout. The 2020 paper says any general-purpose CBDC would be indirect (distributed through banks and other intermediaries), and that limits on issuance and holdings and whether to pay interest need careful consideration.

    Why it counts: A capped, possibly unremunerated digital yen distributed through banks would protect bank deposits (and so bank demand for JGBs) and would not offer a large-scale risk-free alternative to them.

Repealed (1)

  • Yield curve control and negative interest rate policy

    Repealed
    Since
    Mar 19, 2024
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    On 19 March 2024 the Bank of Japan ended Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing with Yield Curve Control and its negative interest rate policy, setting the overnight call rate at around 0 to 0.1 percent. It kept buying JGBs at about 6 trillion yen a month at first.

    Why it counts: For years the framework pinned long-term JGB yields and short-term rates at or below zero, holding savers' returns below inflation; its legacy is the central bank's very large JGB stock.

Before today

8 examples from Japan in the toolkit, past and present, grouped by what the tool does. Each links to the instrument, its other examples and the cited law.

SteerSteer savings to the state

HoldHold the price of money down

Further reading

  • What about Japan?

    Chien, Cole, Lustig · Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2025

    The March 2025 revision examines how Japan’s public sector finances longer-duration risky assets with cheap, largely floating-rate liabilities. Falling real rates expand fiscal room but can disadvantage younger and less financially sophisticated households whose portfolios lack comparable duration.

  • Macroprudential tools, capital controls, and the trilemma: Insights from the Bretton Woods era

    Monnet · CEPR, 2018

    Shows that Bretton Woods capital controls often made domestic credit controls effective rather than simply sustaining international interest-rate gaps. This cautions against measuring repression or monetary autonomy solely from observed interest-rate differentials.

  • The Liquidation of Government Debt

    Reinhart, Sbrancia · IMF, 2015

    Reconstructs government debt portfolios to measure the transfer from savers to governments when controlled interest rates combine with inflation. It finds substantial postwar debt liquidation and explains why high debt after the global financial crisis could revive these policies.

  • Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt

    Arslanalp, Tsuda · IMF, 2012

    Builds comparable sovereign-debt holdings by investor group and introduces indicators of exposure to investor withdrawals. It documents increased bank exposure to home-country government debt after 2008, providing data for studying captive demand without assuming every domestic holding is coerced.

  • Financial repression: Then and now

    Reinhart, Kirkegaard · CEPR, 2012

    Documents the post-2008 return of negative real rates and policies that encourage domestic institutions to absorb public debt. The authors interpret preferential regulatory treatment, pension restrictions and deposit-rate limits as possible modern forms of repression.