Steer · Captive demand
Reserve requirements payable in government paper
- What it is
- Rules letting (or steering) banks meet their compulsory cash-reserve requirement with Treasury bills or bonds instead of central-bank money, often only with paper bought at primary auction or at a fixed administered rate.
- Why it counts
- A non-negotiable regulatory holding is converted into a guaranteed outlet for new government debt, giving the Treasury a captive buyer whose demand is set by deposit volumes rather than yield.
When it was in force
- Italy: 1962 → 1963, historical; the rule may be older than the cited document; its end is not documented
- Argentina: 2021, historical; its end is not documented
- Argentina: 2022, historical; the rule may be older than the cited document; its end is not documented
3 examples
Italy
1962 → 1963HistoricalThe rule may be older than the cited document · Its end is not documented · As cited: early 1960s (option narrowed 'beginning in December', per the 1963 Monthly Review)
Italian banks had been free to choose their own mix of cash and Treasury bills to meet the 22.5% reserve requirement; under the reform they had to hold at least 10 points in cash, and bills needed for reserve purposes were sold at a fixed 3.5% rate outside the auction.
Italy today: index 49.2Bank of Italy compulsory reserve regime (total 22.5% of deposits, payable in cash or Treasury bills) and the accompanying Treasury bill issuance reformSecondary source
“as against the previous option of determining their own mix of cash and bills”
Argentina
2021HistoricalIts end is not documented
Banks allowed to meet part of their reserve requirement with central-bank LELIQ could instead use peso national government securities of 180-450 days bought at primary subscription.
Argentina today: index 40.1Banco Central de la República Argentina, Comunicación "A" 7290 of 27/05/2021 (amending the 'Efectivo mínimo' rules, point 1.3.16)Primary source
“podrán también integrarla con títulos públicos nacionales en pesos que no estén vinculados al dólar estadounidense”
Argentina
2022HistoricalThe rule may be older than the cited document · Its end is not documented
Large banks could meet their peso reserve requirement with a specific Treasury bond maturing 23 May 2027, which was also excluded from public-sector exposure limits.
Argentina today: index 40.1Banco Central de la República Argentina, Comunicación "A" 7511 of 12/05/2022Primary source
“podrán integrar la exigencia de efectivo mínimo en pesos –del período y diaria– con “Bonos del Tesoro Nacional en pesos vencimiento 23 de mayo de 2027””
Examples and their dates reviewed .
More captive demand
Further reading
- The Coming Great Repression? New Measures and a Century of Evidence
- The Sovereign-Bank Nexus in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies: Trends, Determinants, and Macrofinancial Implications
- Financial engineering is no substitute for interest rates: Lessons from Türkiye
- ‘Muddling through or tunnelling through?’ UK monetary and fiscal exceptionalism and the Great Inflation
12 more on captive demand
- The Aftermath of Debt Surges
- The regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures - discussion paper
- Indian Financial Sector: Structure, Trends and Turns
- Financial Regulation and Government Revenue: The Effects of a Policy Change in Ethiopia
- Financial Repression: Evidence and Theory
- The Political Origin of Home Bias: the case of Europe
- The Liquidation of Government Debt
- Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt
- Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt
- Financial repression: Then and now
- A New Database of Financial Reforms
- Financial Repression and Exchange Rate Management in Developing Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence for India