Hold · Central bank financing
Government bond yield pegs and yield curve control
- What it is
- The central bank sets a yield or price target for Treasury bills, selected government bonds or the yield curve, buying whatever quantity its commitment requires.
- Why it counts
- Price support holds government borrowing yields below the level that would clear the market without central-bank purchases.
When it was in force
- United States: 1942 → 1951, historical
- Japan: 2024, historical; the rule may be older than the cited document; its end is not documented
- Australia: 2020, historical; its end is not documented
3 examples
United States
1942 → 1951HistoricalThe Fed pegged short Treasury bills at 3/8% and supported a 2.5% ceiling on long Treasury bonds to cheapen war finance.
United States today: index 42.9Wartime Federal Reserve–Treasury interest-rate support policy, ended by the March 1951 AccordSecondary source
“the Fed maintained the low interest rate by buying large amounts of government securities, which also increased the money supply.”
Japan
2024HistoricalThe rule may be older than the cited document · Its end is not documented · As cited: January 2024 (documented decision)
The BOJ committed to purchases without an upper quantity limit under a ten-year yield target, while treating 1% as an operational reference.
Japan today: index 64.9Bank of Japan Statement on Monetary Policy of 23 January 2024, paragraph 1(1)Primary source
“without setting an upper limit so that 10-year JGB yields will remain at around zero percent.”
Australia
2020HistoricalIts end is not documented · As cited: from March 2020
The RBA targeted the three-year Australian Government bond yield at around 0.25%.
Australia today: index 16.9Reserve Bank Board decision announced 19 March 2020, media release 2020-08Primary source
“A target for the yield on 3-year Australian Government bonds of around 0.25 per cent.”
Examples and their dates reviewed .
More central bank financing
Further reading
- The Coming Great Repression? New Measures and a Century of Evidence
- Financial engineering is no substitute for interest rates: Lessons from Türkiye
- What about Japan?
- Argentina: Request for an Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility—Press Release; Staff Report; Staff Supplement; and Statement by the Executive Director for Argentina (IMF Country Report No. 25/95)
7 more on central bank financing
- ‘Muddling through or tunnelling through?’ UK monetary and fiscal exceptionalism and the Great Inflation
- Reassessing the fall in US public debt after World War II
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- Indian Financial Sector: Structure, Trends and Turns
- Financial Regulation and Government Revenue: The Effects of a Policy Change in Ethiopia
- Financial repression: Then and now
- Financial Repression and Exchange Rate Management in Developing Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence for India