Financial Repression Tracker

Rules that steer savings into government debt or hold returns below inflation, country by country.

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United States

U.S. financial repression works mostly through bank and fund regulation that favors Treasuries: zero risk weights, Level 1 liquidity status, government money-fund carve-outs and, since 2025, stablecoin reserve rules. The Fed ended balance-sheet runoff in December 2025 and resumed T-bill purchases for reserve management, and the leverage ratio was eased from April 2026. Capital controls are light, and rent caps exist at state and city level.

Repression index
42.9 / 100
Once enacted laws apply
50.6 (+7.7)
  • 15 in force
  • 1 enacted
  • 4 proposed or under discussion

Measures as of

How the index is built

Each segment is what one category of rules, or the market pillar, adds to the index. The full bar is 100.

  • Captive demand 3.2
  • Central bank financing 9.6
  • Capital controls 10.4
  • Rate caps 0.0
  • Prudential sovereign bias 7.0
  • Directed credit 0.0
  • Tax incentives 2.5
  • Real asset restrictions 3.3
  • Transaction taxes 0.0
  • Market pillar 7.0

Index = 80% × rules (44.9) + 20% × market (35.0) = 42.9

The method in plain words
  • Rules pillar (0–100). Each of the 9 categories can add up to its weight (the weights sum to 100). A category's intensity grows with every in-force measure in it: one measure counts by its severity factor (0.25 for severity 1, 0.5 for 2, 0.8 for 3), and each further measure closes part of the remaining gap, so breadth adds with diminishing returns: two severity-3 measures give 96%.
  • Market pillar (0–100). The average of the market readings below: how negative the real policy rate is, and how much of the government's debt is held by its own central bank and banks.
  • Index. 80% rules + 20% market when market data exists, otherwise rules alone. Laws passed but not yet applying count only in the outlook; proposals never count.

The 9 categories

Weight = the most points a category can add to the rules pillar. Intensity = how much of that weight the in-force measures fill. Open a category to see the measures counted; “What is this?” shows the instruments behind it, worldwide and in history.

  • 1 enacted, 2 proposed not countedWeight 16Intensity 25%Points 3.2 → 10.9 once enacted laws apply

    Mandated holdings of government debt by pension funds, insurers or banks. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 75%Points 9.6

    Central bank purchases of government debt, yield curve control, direct monetary financing. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 81%Points 10.4

    Limits on moving money abroad, outbound investment limits, FX controls. What is this? →

  • Rate capsWeight 14Intensity 0%Points 0.0

    Caps or ceilings on deposit or lending rates, and administered interest rates. No in-force measures here. What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 88%Points 7.0

    Prudential rules that favor sovereign debt (zero risk weights, liquidity-buffer rules, leverage-ratio exemptions). What is this? →

  • Directed creditWeight 10Intensity 0%Points 0.0

    State-directed lending, credit guidance, and mandates to invest domestically or in state priorities. No in-force measures here. What is this? →

  • 1 proposed not countedWeight 7Intensity 44%Points 2.5

    Tax privileges for government bonds, or tax penalties on competing assets. What is this? →

  • Weight 6Intensity 68%Points 3.3

    Rent controls, property curbs, and limits on owning gold, cash or crypto. What is this? →

  • Transaction taxes1 proposed not countedWeight 5Intensity 0%Points 0.0

    Financial transaction taxes, stamp duties and similar levies on non-government assets. No in-force measures here. What is this? →

Market pillar 35.0 / 100

The average of the readings that have data, worth 20% of the index (7.0 points here).

Indicators

Measured data from international sources, alongside the rules above. Real rates below zero mean savers lose purchasing power.

Real policy rate
0.2%
Aug 2026
Government debt
124% of GDP
2025
Liquidation effect (est.)
None
real rates are positive
Debt held by central bank
11.7%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic banks
15.1%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic non-banks
51.4%
Q4 2025
Debt held by foreign holders
21.8%
Q4 2025
Capital account openness
1.00 of 1
2023

Policy rate, inflation and real rate

Negative real rates-10-50510200520102015202020253.93.40.2

Who holds government debt

0102030405060702005201020152020202551.421.815.111.7

The liquidation effect follows Reinhart and Sbrancia: with a negative real rate, about −(real rate × debt) of GDP moves from savers to the state each year. It uses the policy rate, so treat it as a rough guide. Sources: BIS, BIS central bank policy rates; BIS consumer prices; IMF, IMF DataMapper: World Economic Outlook (October 2026); Fiscal Monitor (October 2026); Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito, The Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN): a de jure measure of financial openness; IMF, Sovereign Debt Investor Base for Advanced Economies / for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda).

Measures

Every measure tracked here, with its legal basis and sources. Only in-force measures count in the index.

In force (15)

  • New York City rent freeze on stabilized apartments

    In force
    Since
    Oct 1, 2026
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.8 points to the index

    On 25 June 2026 the NYC Rent Guidelines Board voted to freeze rents on one- and two-year leases for about one million rent-stabilized apartments, for leases starting from 1 October 2026. It was the first freeze since the pandemic and the first to cover two-year leases.

    Why it counts: A nominal freeze while prices rise cuts real rental income for owners of regulated housing.

  • Enhanced supplementary leverage ratio recalibrated

    In force
    Since
    Apr 1, 2026
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.3 points to the index

    The Fed, FDIC and OCC finalized a rule on 25 November 2025 that replaces the fixed 2% eSLR buffer for GSIB holding companies with half of each firm's method 1 GSIB surcharge, with bank subsidiaries' buffer capped at 1%. It took effect on 1 April 2026, with optional early adoption from 1 January 2026. The rule recalibrates the ratio rather than excluding Treasuries outright, a carve-out that officials, including the Treasury Secretary, have publicly discussed.

    Why it counts: A less binding leverage ratio lowers the capital cost of holding and dealing in low-risk-weight assets like Treasuries, so large banks can absorb more government debt.

  • Fed reserve management purchases of Treasury bills

    In force
    Since
    Dec 12, 2025
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.8 points to the index

    From 12 December 2025 the New York Fed began buying Treasury bills (and, if needed, securities up to three years) to keep reserves ample, at about $40 billion a month. The pace was cut to about $25 billion in mid-April 2026 and $10 billion a month from mid-May, and the Desk has scheduled no reserve management purchases since 14 August 2026, although the FOMC directive remains in place.

    Why it counts: The central bank again adds Treasury securities to its balance sheet, financing part of the government's short-term borrowing with reserves.

  • Fed ends balance-sheet runoff and reinvests into T-bills

    In force
    Since
    Dec 1, 2025
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.8 points to the index

    The FOMC decided on 29 October 2025 to end the reduction of its securities holdings from 1 December 2025. All maturing Treasuries are rolled over at auction and all principal payments from agency MBS are reinvested into Treasury bills.

    Why it counts: The Fed stops shrinking its holdings and redirects mortgage runoff into government bills, keeping a large central-bank holding of Treasury debt.

  • Washington State rent stabilization (HB 1217)

    In force
    Since
    May 7, 2025
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.8 points to the index

    Washington's HB 1217, signed in May 2025, caps annual rent increases at 7% plus CPI or 10%, whichever is lower, until July 2040, with a 5% cap for manufactured homes. New construction (12 years), public and tax-credit housing, and owner-occupied single-family homes and small multiplexes not owned by REITs or corporations are exempt.

    Why it counts: Statewide caps limit landlords' ability to pass inflation through to rents, lowering the real return on rental property.

  • Outbound investment rules for China (OISP and COINS Act)

    In force
    Since
    Jan 2, 2025
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.8 points to the index

    Treasury's Outbound Investment Security Program, effective 2 January 2025, bans or requires notice of U.S. investments in Chinese, Hong Kong and Macau firms in semiconductors, quantum and AI. The COINS Act in the FY2026 NDAA (December 2025) put the program into statute, widening countries of concern to include Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia and Maduro-regime Venezuela and adding high-performance computing and hypersonics, to be applied through new Treasury rules replacing Part 850.

    Why it counts: It bars or limits some foreign investment options for U.S. capital; the aim is national security, but the effect is a narrower set of places to invest abroad.

  • Broker reporting of crypto sales on Form 1099-DA

    In force
    Since
    Jan 1, 2025
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.3 points to the index

    Final Treasury regulations under IRC 6045 require custodial digital-asset brokers to report customers' gross proceeds on the new Form 1099-DA for sales on or after 1 January 2025, with cost-basis reporting for assets acquired in a custodial account from 1 January 2026. The only de minimis thresholds are reporting ones: brokers may report qualifying stablecoin sales in aggregate only above $10,000 a year per customer, and payment-processor sales only above $600. A separate rule extending broker reporting to decentralized-finance front ends was annulled by Congress in April 2025 (Public Law 119-5).

    Why it counts: Third-party reporting ties crypto holdings at U.S. platforms to taxpayer identities and lets the IRS match every sale, reducing the scope to hold crypto outside the tax net and pushing users who want privacy toward self-custody or foreign platforms.

  • Money market fund reform favors government funds

    In force
    Since
    Jul 12, 2023
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 3.2 points to the index

    SEC reforms adopted in July 2023 impose mandatory liquidity fees on institutional prime and institutional tax-exempt money market funds when daily net redemptions exceed 5% (from 2 October 2024), and raise liquidity minimums to 25% daily (not for tax-exempt funds) and 50% weekly. Government money market funds are exempt from the mandatory fee.

    Why it counts: Making prime funds costlier and less convenient pushes cash toward government money funds, which invest almost entirely in Treasuries and government-backed repo.

  • California Tenant Protection Act rent cap

    In force
    Since
    Jan 1, 2020
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.8 points to the index

    AB 1482 limits annual rent increases on covered units to 5% plus CPI, with a 10% ceiling. Newer buildings (rolling 15 years) and many single-family homes owned by individuals are exempt, and the cap is set to expire on 1 January 2030 unless extended.

    Why it counts: Rent growth is held below what the market would set in high-inflation years, which erodes real returns on rental housing.

  • Oregon statewide rent cap

    In force
    Since
    2019
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.8 points to the index

    Oregon caps annual rent increases at 7% plus CPI or 10%, whichever is lower, with a 6% cap for larger manufactured-home parks and marinas. The maximum is 9.5% for 2026 and 10% for 2027, and buildings less than 15 years old are exempt.

    Why it counts: Caps on rent growth limit the inflation protection of rental property, cutting real returns for landlords.

  • Treasuries count as Level 1 liquid assets in the LCR

    In force
    Since
    Sep 2014
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.3 points to the index

    The liquidity coverage ratio requires large banks to hold high-quality liquid assets against 30-day stressed outflows. Reserve balances and Treasury securities qualify as Level 1 assets with no haircut and no cap, while other assets face haircuts and limits.

    Why it counts: Banks must keep a large standing buffer, and Treasuries are the main non-cash way to meet it, which builds structural bank demand for government debt.

  • Crypto taxed as property: every disposal is a capital-gains event

    In force
    Since
    2014
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.2 points to the index

    Since IRS Notice 2014-21, digital assets are treated as property, not currency, so every sale, swap or spend of crypto is a taxable disposal. Gains on assets held more than one year are taxed at the long-term rates of 0%, 15% or 20% depending on income, while gains on assets held one year or less are taxed as ordinary income; net capital losses can offset only $3,000 of other income a year. There is no de minimis exemption for small payments, and every federal income tax return asks whether the filer received or disposed of a digital asset.

    Why it counts: Treating crypto as property rather than currency makes each everyday payment in bitcoin or other tokens a reportable gain or loss, which taxes and complicates the use of crypto as an alternative money while dollar cash carries no such burden.

  • Zero risk weight for U.S. government exposures

    In force
    Since
    2013
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.3 points to the index

    Under the U.S. capital rules' standardized approach, banks assign a 0% risk weight to exposures to the U.S. government, the Federal Reserve and U.S. government agencies, and to the portion of exposures they unconditionally guarantee.

    Why it counts: Holding Treasuries uses no risk-based capital, so banks have a regulatory incentive to hold government debt rather than loans or corporate securities.

  • FBAR and FATCA foreign-account reporting

    In force
    Since
    2010
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.3 points to the index

    U.S. persons must report foreign financial accounts to FinCEN (FBAR, a Bank Secrecy Act requirement dating from 1970) when their combined value exceeds $10,000 at any time in a year, and report specified foreign assets on IRS Form 8938 under FATCA (enacted 2010) above higher thresholds, from $50,000 at year-end or $75,000 at any time for single filers living in the U.S. A foreign account holding only virtual currency is currently not reportable on the FBAR; FinCEN said in Notice 2020-2 (December 2020) that it intends to propose adding virtual currency as a reportable account type, but no such rule has been issued.

    Why it counts: Reporting obligations, with heavy penalties for non-filing, make holding wealth abroad visible to U.S. authorities and costly to manage, discouraging savers from moving assets out of the domestic system; the pending FBAR extension would bring crypto held at foreign platforms into the same net.

  • Treasury interest exempt from state and local tax

    In force
    Since
    1982
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.2 points to the index

    Federal law, codified at 31 U.S.C. 3124 when Title 31 was re-enacted in 1982, bars states and localities from taxing U.S. government obligations or their interest, apart from certain nondiscriminatory franchise taxes and estate or inheritance taxes.

    Why it counts: Savers in high-tax states earn more after tax on Treasuries than on comparable bank deposits or corporate bonds, which tilts demand toward federal debt.

Enacted, not yet in force (1)

  • GENIUS Act: stablecoin reserves in cash and short T-bills, no interest to holders

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Jul 18, 2025
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 9.2 points once it applies

    The GENIUS Act (S. 1582), signed on 18 July 2025, requires payment-stablecoin issuers to hold at least one dollar of reserves per coin. Reserves are limited to cash and Fed balances, insured deposits, Treasury bills, notes or bonds maturing within 93 days, short Treasury repos and reverse repos, government money market funds, and other similarly liquid federal assets a regulator approves. Issuers may not pay holders any interest or yield, only permitted issuers may issue payment stablecoins in the United States, and three years after enactment platforms may not offer or sell stablecoins from non-permitted issuers to U.S. persons, while foreign issuers' coins need a comparable-regime determination. The Act takes effect on the earlier of 18 months after enactment (18 January 2027) or 120 days after final implementing regulations; the only final implementing rule found (Treasury, 30 September 2026) would point to a later date, so the requirements apply from 18 January 2027. The ban on platforms offering non-permitted stablecoins applies 3 years after enactment (July 2028).

    Why it counts: Forcing stablecoin reserves into cash, deposits and short Treasuries turns every dollar stablecoin into a buyer of government debt, and the interest ban stops issuers passing that Treasury yield to holders, so stablecoins cannot compete with bank deposits on return. The licensing and offer bans shut out unlicensed and non-compliant foreign stablecoins from U.S. platforms.

Proposed (4)

  • Digital Asset Tax Certainty Act: wash-sale rule for crypto (H.R. 10357)

    Proposed
    Since
    Sep 14, 2026
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    H.R. 10357, introduced on 14 September 2026 and taken up at a House Ways and Means markup on 16 September 2026, would extend the wash-sale rule (IRC 1091) from stocks and securities to traded digital assets other than qualified U.S. dollar stablecoins, and apply the constructive-sale rules to digital assets. In the other direction it would exempt from gain or loss crypto spent on network or transaction fees of up to $10 and ease the tax treatment of dollar stablecoin transactions.

    Why it counts: Applying the wash-sale rule would end crypto investors' ability to sell at a loss and immediately buy back to harvest tax losses, raising the effective tax on holding crypto, while the narrow $10 fee de minimis leaves ordinary crypto payments taxable.

  • CLARITY Act (H.R. 3633): market structure bill with ban on stablecoin yield via platforms

    Proposed
    Since
    Jun 1, 2026
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act (H.R. 3633) would set up SEC/CFTC registration for crypto trading platforms and intermediaries and, as passed by the House, bar the Fed from issuing a CBDC. The version reported by the Senate Banking Committee on 1 June 2026 adds section 404, which bars crypto platforms and their affiliates from paying U.S. customers any interest or yield for simply holding payment stablecoins or on balances in a way equivalent to bank-deposit interest, allowing only activity-based rewards. On 15 September 2026 the Senate rejected cloture on the motion to proceed 49-50; a motion to reconsider was entered, so the bill is stalled rather than dead.

    Why it counts: Extending the GENIUS Act's issuer interest ban to exchanges and affiliates would stop savers earning the T-bill yield behind dollar stablecoins, explicitly to protect bank deposit funding, keeping the private dollar alternative below market returns.

  • GENIUS Act implementing rules (OCC, FDIC, Treasury)

    Proposed
    Since
    Feb 25, 2026
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    The OCC proposed rules (announced 25 February 2026, published 2 March 2026) to implement the GENIUS Act, including 1:1 segregated reserves limited to assets such as cash, deposits, Treasury bills, notes or bonds with 93 days or less to maturity, certain repos and government money market funds. The FDIC (April 2026), NCUA (May 2026), Treasury (anti-money-laundering and sanctions rules in April 2026, issuance rules in August 2026) and the Federal Reserve (September 2026) issued related proposals.

    Why it counts: The rules fix in regulation which assets can back stablecoins, with short Treasury bills at the core, which locks in stablecoin issuers as T-bill buyers.

  • Wall Street Tax Act (financial transaction tax bill)

    Proposed
    Since
    Jun 17, 2025
    Category
    Transaction taxes
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    Bills in the House (H.R. 4035) and Senate (S. 2127) introduced in June 2025 would tax trades in stocks, bonds and derivatives, phasing in from 0.02% to 0.1%. Both remain in committee.

    Why it counts: A tax on each trade would lower the net return on market investments and raise the cost of moving savings between assets.

Repealed (2)

  • Unhosted-wallet and crypto-mixing reporting proposals (withdrawn)

    Repealed
    Since
    Oct 6, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    FinCEN proposed in December 2020 to require banks and money services businesses to keep records, report and verify the identity of counterparties for crypto transfers to or from unhosted (self-custody) wallets, and in October 2023 to impose special reporting on transactions involving international crypto mixing. On 6 October 2026 FinCEN withdrew both proposals and said it will take no further action on the unhosted-wallet rule.

    Why it counts: Had they been finalized, the rules would have attached identity checks and reports to moving crypto between regulated platforms and self-custody, and to privacy-enhancing mixing, curbing the use of self-custody to hold savings outside the regulated system. Their withdrawal removes that pending restriction.

  • Bank-regulator prior approval for crypto activities (rescinded)

    Repealed
    Since
    Apr 24, 2025
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    From 2021 to 2023 the OCC (Interpretive Letter 1179), FDIC (FIL-16-2022) and Federal Reserve (2022 and 2023 supervisory letters) required banks to notify their supervisor, or obtain a supervisory non-objection, before engaging in crypto custody, stablecoin or other crypto-asset activities. The OCC rescinded its letter on 7 March 2025, the FDIC on 28 March 2025 and the Fed on 24 April 2025, so banks may now engage in permissible crypto activities without prior approval.

    Why it counts: The prior-approval gates kept banks from offering custody, stablecoin and crypto services and cut crypto firms off from banking channels, making it harder for savers to move between bank money and crypto. Their rescission removes that barrier.

Before today

23 examples from United States in the toolkit, past and present, grouped by what the tool does. Each links to the instrument, its other examples and the cited law.

SteerSteer savings to the state

HoldHold the price of money down

BlockBlock the exits

RewriteRewrite the deal in a crisis

Further reading

  • Reassessing the fall in US public debt after World War II

    Acalin, Ball · CEPR, 2023

    Reassesses the US postwar debt decline by separating growth from primary surpluses, surprise inflation and the Federal Reserve’s wartime rate peg. It argues that growth alone explains much less debt reduction than commonly claimed and that repeating the historical interest-rate distortions would be difficult.

  • Monetisation: Do not panic

    Pisani-Ferry, Blanchard · CEPR, 2020

    Argues, from the April 2020 perspective, that pandemic bond purchases did not themselves establish fiscal dominance or inevitable inflation. Whether central banks later raise rates and remunerate reserves matters more than the initial scale of purchases.

  • Financial Repression: Evidence and Theory

    Chari, Dovis, Kehoe · Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2016

    Explains how compulsory bank holdings can strengthen a government’s commitment to repay by making default more costly. The model supports repression only under urgent financing needs and weak repayment credibility, because the benefit comes at the expense of productive private investment.

  • The Liquidation of Government Debt

    Reinhart, Sbrancia · IMF, 2015

    Reconstructs government debt portfolios to measure the transfer from savers to governments when controlled interest rates combine with inflation. It finds substantial postwar debt liquidation and explains why high debt after the global financial crisis could revive these policies.

  • Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt

    Arslanalp, Tsuda · IMF, 2012

    Builds comparable sovereign-debt holdings by investor group and introduces indicators of exposure to investor withdrawals. It documents increased bank exposure to home-country government debt after 2008, providing data for studying captive demand without assuming every domestic holding is coerced.

  • Financial repression: Then and now

    Reinhart, Kirkegaard · CEPR, 2012

    Documents the post-2008 return of negative real rates and policies that encourage domestic institutions to absorb public debt. The authors interpret preferential regulatory treatment, pension restrictions and deposit-rate limits as possible modern forms of repression.