Financial Repression Tracker

Rules that steer savings into government debt or hold returns below inflation, country by country.

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United Kingdom

UK pension regulation steers defined benefit schemes into gilts, and since the 2022 LDI crisis the Bank of England has added a standing repo backstop for gilt holders. The Pension Schemes Act 2026 created a reserve power to mandate DC pension allocations, while stamp duty on shares and the gilt CGT exemption tilt tax treatment toward government bonds. In September 2026 the Bank set a multi-year plan to unwind QE that routes any gilt sales to the DMO.

Repression index
44.4 / 100
Once enacted laws apply
53.5 (+9.1)
  • 15 in force
  • 4 enacted
  • 2 proposed or under discussion

Measures as of

How the index is built

Each segment is what one category of rules, or the market pillar, adds to the index. The full bar is 100.

  • Captive demand 8.0
  • Central bank financing 8.0
  • Capital controls 6.4
  • Rate caps 0.0
  • Prudential sovereign bias 4.0
  • Directed credit 2.0
  • Tax incentives 3.5
  • Real asset restrictions 3.8
  • Transaction taxes 2.5
  • Market pillar 6.2

Index = 80% × rules (47.7) + 20% × market (30.8) = 44.4

The method in plain words
  • Rules pillar (0–100). Each of the 9 categories can add up to its weight (the weights sum to 100). A category's intensity grows with every in-force measure in it: one measure counts by its severity factor (0.25 for severity 1, 0.5 for 2, 0.8 for 3), and each further measure closes part of the remaining gap, so breadth adds with diminishing returns: two severity-3 measures give 96%.
  • Market pillar (0–100). The average of the market readings below: how negative the real policy rate is, and how much of the government's debt is held by its own central bank and banks.
  • Index. 80% rules + 20% market when market data exists, otherwise rules alone. Laws passed but not yet applying count only in the outlook; proposals never count.

The 9 categories

Weight = the most points a category can add to the rules pillar. Intensity = how much of that weight the in-force measures fill. Open a category to see the measures counted; “What is this?” shows the instruments behind it, worldwide and in history.

  • 1 enacted, 2 proposed not countedWeight 16Intensity 63%Points 8.0 → 10.4 once enacted laws apply

    Mandated holdings of government debt by pension funds, insurers or banks. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 63%Points 8.0

    Central bank purchases of government debt, yield curve control, direct monetary financing. What is this? →

  • 1 enacted not countedWeight 16Intensity 50%Points 6.4 → 9.6 once enacted laws apply

    Limits on moving money abroad, outbound investment limits, FX controls. What is this? →

  • Rate capsWeight 14Intensity 0%Points 0.0

    Caps or ceilings on deposit or lending rates, and administered interest rates. No in-force measures here. What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 50%Points 4.0

    Prudential rules that favor sovereign debt (zero risk weights, liquidity-buffer rules, leverage-ratio exemptions). What is this? →

  • 1 enacted not countedWeight 10Intensity 25%Points 2.0 → 5.0 once enacted laws apply

    State-directed lending, credit guidance, and mandates to invest domestically or in state priorities. What is this? →

  • 1 enacted not countedWeight 7Intensity 63%Points 3.5 → 4.0 once enacted laws apply

    Tax privileges for government bonds, or tax penalties on competing assets. What is this? →

  • Weight 6Intensity 79%Points 3.8

    Rent controls, property curbs, and limits on owning gold, cash or crypto. What is this? →

  • Weight 5Intensity 63%Points 2.5

    Financial transaction taxes, stamp duties and similar levies on non-government assets. What is this? →

Market pillar 30.8 / 100

The average of the readings that have data, worth 20% of the index (6.2 points here).

Indicators

Measured data from international sources, alongside the rules above. Real rates below zero mean savers lose purchasing power.

Real policy rate
0.7%
Aug 2026
Government debt
102% of GDP
2025
Liquidation effect (est.)
None
real rates are positive
Debt held by central bank
17.8%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic banks
7.7%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic non-banks
44.0%
Q4 2025
Debt held by foreign holders
30.5%
Q4 2025
Capital account openness
1.00 of 1
2023

Policy rate, inflation and real rate

Negative real rates-10-5051015200520102015202020253.83.10.7

Who holds government debt

0204060801002005201020152020202544.030.517.87.7

The liquidation effect follows Reinhart and Sbrancia: with a negative real rate, about −(real rate × debt) of GDP moves from savers to the state each year. It uses the policy rate, so treat it as a rough guide. Sources: BIS, BIS central bank policy rates; BIS consumer prices; IMF, IMF DataMapper: World Economic Outlook (October 2026); Fiscal Monitor (October 2026); Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito, The Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN): a de jure measure of financial openness; IMF, Sovereign Debt Investor Base for Advanced Economies / for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda).

Measures

Every measure tracked here, with its legal basis and sources. Only in-force measures count in the index.

In force (15)

  • Renters' Rights Act 2025 (England)

    In force
    Since
    May 1, 2026
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.7 points to the index

    From 1 May 2026, private landlords in England can raise rent only once a year through a statutory notice with two months' warning, rent review clauses are void, and tenants can challenge increases at the First-tier Tribunal. It does not set a numerical cap.

    Why it counts: Limits on how often and how rents rise slow landlords' ability to keep pace with inflation, trimming real returns on rental property.

  • Scotland: rent control areas (Housing (Scotland) Act 2025)

    In force
    Since
    Apr 1, 2026
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.7 points to the index

    The Housing (Scotland) Act 2025 lets ministers designate rent control areas where annual private rent rises are capped at CPI plus 1%, with a 6% maximum; these powers came into force on 1 April 2026. Local authority reports on rents are due by 31 May 2027, and no area has yet been designated; mid-market and build-to-rent homes are exempt under regulations in force since 1 April 2026.

    Why it counts: A cap tied to inflation plus a fixed ceiling limits real rent growth in high-inflation years.

  • Cryptoasset Reporting Framework: exchanges report UK users' holdings and trades to HMRC

    In force
    Since
    Jan 1, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 6.4 points to the index

    From 1 January 2026 UK reporting cryptoasset service providers (exchanges, brokers, dealers) must collect tax-residence and identity data on all users and report users resident in the UK or in CARF partner countries, with a summary of their transactions, to HMRC each year. The first report, covering calendar 2026, is due between 1 January and 31 May 2027; penalties run up to GBP 300 per user, and providers may refuse service to customers who do not supply the information.

    Why it counts: Ends practical anonymity for crypto held through intermediaries, including purely domestic UK users (the UK extended CARF to its own residents), so holdings moved out of the banking system become visible to the tax authority much like bank interest.

  • SDRT holiday for newly listed companies

    In force
    Since
    Nov 27, 2025
    Category
    Transaction taxes
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.7 points to the index

    From 27 November 2025, trades in shares of companies newly listed on a UK regulated market are exempt from the 0.5% SDRT for three years after listing, except where the listing stems from a merger of listed companies or a holding-company reorganisation, or control of the company changes after listing.

    Why it counts: It narrows the share-trading tax for new listings, slightly reducing the tax gap between equities and gilts.

  • Mansion House Accord (voluntary UK allocation pledge)

    In force
    Since
    May 13, 2025
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.0 points to the index

    Seventeen workplace pension providers pledged in May 2025 to put at least 10% of DC default funds into private markets by 2030, with at least 5% in UK assets, subject to supply. It builds on the 2023 Mansion House Compact.

    Why it counts: Government-encouraged pledges steer pension savings toward domestic priorities, backed by the threat of the statutory reserve power.

  • Contingent NBFI Repo Facility for gilt holders

    In force
    Since
    Jan 28, 2025
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.3 points to the index

    Since January 2025 the Bank of England can lend cash against gilts to eligible insurers, DB pension schemes and LDI funds during severe gilt market dysfunction. Participants generally need around GBP 2 billion of gilts.

    Why it counts: A standing central bank backstop makes gilts easier to finance in a crisis, which supports institutional demand for them.

  • DB pension funding code: low-dependency investment by maturity

    In force
    Since
    Sep 22, 2024
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 5.7 points to the index

    The DB funding regime (the 2024 Funding and Investment Strategy Regulations, with the Pensions Regulator's DB funding code), applying to valuations from 22 September 2024, requires defined benefit schemes to plan for a low-dependency investment allocation, highly resilient to market moves, by the time they reach significant maturity.

    Why it counts: Mature DB schemes are pushed toward bond-heavy, liability-matching portfolios in which gilts and index-linked gilts dominate.

  • Cryptoasset financial promotions regime: 24-hour cooling-off, appropriateness tests, incentive ban

    In force
    Since
    Oct 8, 2023
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.7 points to the index

    Since 8 October 2023 promoting qualifying cryptoassets to UK consumers, including by overseas firms, is a regulated financial promotion: it must be made or approved by an FCA-authorised firm or an MLR-registered crypto business, or fall within an exemption, otherwise it is a criminal offence. Crypto is classed as a restricted mass market investment, so firms must impose a 24-hour cooling-off period for first-time investors before a direct offer, run appropriateness assessments, show prescribed risk warnings and may not offer 'refer a friend' or similar investment incentives.

    Why it counts: Adds mandatory frictions and warnings to every new retail purchase and lets the FCA block foreign platforms from advertising to UK savers, discouraging switching from deposits and gilts into crypto.

  • LDI resilience buffers after the 2022 gilt crisis

    In force
    Since
    Apr 24, 2023
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.3 points to the index

    After the September 2022 LDI crisis, the Pensions Regulator issued guidance (April 2023) that leveraged LDI arrangements used by pension schemes should operate a market stress buffer of at least 250 basis points plus an operational buffer, following a Bank of England FPC recommendation.

    Why it counts: Schemes must keep more collateral, usually gilts and cash, behind gilt-based hedges, which keeps them as committed gilt holders with less leverage.

  • FCA ban on selling crypto derivatives to retail clients (ETN part lifted October 2025)

    In force
    Since
    Jan 6, 2021
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 1.7 points to the index

    Since 6 January 2021 FCA rules (COBS 22.6) bar firms acting in or from the UK from selling, distributing or marketing derivatives (CFDs, options, futures) and exchange traded notes referencing unregulated cryptoassets such as bitcoin to retail clients. From 8 October 2025 the ETN part was lifted for crypto ETNs admitted to a UK recognised investment exchange, which are now treated as restricted mass market investments; the derivatives ban and the ban on non-UK-RIE crypto ETNs remain.

    Why it counts: Retail savers cannot gain leveraged or hedged crypto exposure through UK firms, and regulated exchange-traded exposure is limited to UK-listed ETNs subject to marketing frictions and no FSCS cover, narrowing the routes by which savings move into crypto.

  • Capital gains tax on cryptoasset disposals (no gilt-style exemption)

    In force
    Since
    Dec 19, 2018
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.5 points to the index

    HMRC treats cryptoasset tokens as chargeable assets: selling them, swapping one token for another, spending them or giving them away (except to a spouse, civil partner or charity) is a disposal for capital gains tax. Gains above the GBP 3,000 annual exempt amount are taxed at 18% where they fall within the basic-rate income tax band and 24% above it (the rates gov.uk shows for gains from 6 April 2026), with share-style pooling and same-day / 30-day matching rules.

    Why it counts: Every crypto-to-crypto swap and every purchase paid in crypto is a taxable event, and only a GBP 3,000 allowance shelters gains, whereas gains on gilts are fully exempt (see uk-gilt-cgt-exemption); this widens the after-tax gap in favour of government debt.

  • Bank prudential rules favoring gilts (LCR Level 1, large-exposure exemption)

    In force
    Since
    Oct 2015
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.0 points to the index

    Under the PRA's onshored rules, UK government debt counts as a Level 1 liquid asset with no haircut, carries a zero risk weight, and exposures to it are exempt from large-exposure limits.

    Why it counts: Banks can meet liquidity and capital rules by holding gilts at little regulatory cost, which builds structural demand for government debt.

  • Bank of England APF gilt holdings and QT plan

    In force
    Since
    Mar 2009
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 5.7 points to the index

    The Bank of England's Asset Purchase Facility still holds about GBP 488 billion of gilts bought under QE. On 17 September 2026 the MPC set a multi-year plan to unwind the monetary-policy stock by 2034, at about GBP 46 billion a year including GBP 20 billion of annual sales, which the Bank intends to make to the Government (the DMO) rather than the market, subject to agreement with HM Treasury; APF auctions are paused meanwhile. Separately, the Bank Executive will hold around GBP 120 billion of the longest-dated gilts to maturity to back banknotes indirectly.

    Why it counts: Large central bank holdings keep gilt yields lower than otherwise; a slow, pre-announced unwind that leaves long-dated gilts untouched limits the pressure on long yields.

  • Capital gains on gilts exempt from tax

    In force
    Since
    Jul 2, 1986
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.0 points to the index

    Under section 115 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992, disposals of gilt-edged securities have been exempt from capital gains tax since 2 July 1986.

    Why it counts: Low-coupon gilts bought below par give tax-free gains, which makes them more attractive to taxable savers than shares or deposits.

  • Stamp duty / SDRT of 0.5% on UK share purchases

    In force
    Since
    1986
    Category
    Transaction taxes
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 1.8 points to the index

    Buyers of UK shares pay 0.5% stamp duty reserve tax on electronic trades, or 0.5% stamp duty on paper transfers over GBP 1,000, and 1.5% on transfers into some depositary receipt or clearance systems. Gilts, and shares traded on recognised growth markets, are not subject to the charge.

    Why it counts: Taxing share purchases but not gilts lowers the net return on UK equities relative to government bonds.

Enacted, not yet in force (4)

  • Cash ISA allowance cut to GBP 12,000 for under-65s

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Sep 10, 2026
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 0.9 points once it applies

    Regulations made on 10 September 2026, following the November 2025 Budget, provide that from 6 April 2027 savers under 65 can put at most GBP 12,000 of the GBP 20,000 ISA allowance into cash. Transfers from stocks-and-shares ISAs into cash ISAs are barred for them, and interest on cash held in stocks-and-shares ISAs faces a flat 22% charge, alongside new money-market-fund rules.

    Why it counts: Removing tax shelter from part of cash savings steers savers toward stocks and shares, with the government aiming to boost investment in UK markets.

  • FCA stablecoin rules: backing assets limited to bank deposits and government debt

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Jun 30, 2026
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 4.3 points once it applies

    Under the FCA's final stablecoin rules (Cryptoassets (Stablecoins) Instrument 2026, made on 25 June 2026 and published in PS26/10 on 30 June 2026, new CASS 16), a UK issuer of a qualifying stablecoin may hold only 'core backing assets' - on-demand deposits and short-term government debt (UK or Zone A sovereign, maturity of 365 days or fewer) - unless it notifies the FCA and meets extra conditions to hold 'expanded' assets such as longer-dated government debt, public-debt CNAV money market funds and repos. Even then a minimum share (at least 5% of the pool, or the highest daily redemption rate of the past 180 days) must stay in core assets, on top of a 5% on-demand deposit requirement. The rules apply from 25 October 2027.

    Why it counts: Every pound placed in a UK-issued stablecoin must be parked in bank deposits or sovereign debt, so stablecoin growth becomes a source of captive demand for gilts (and Zone A government bills) rather than an escape from them.

  • Pension Schemes Act 2026: reserve power to mandate asset allocation

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Apr 29, 2026
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 3.5 points once it applies

    The Pension Schemes Act 2026 (Royal Assent 29 April 2026) gives the government a reserve power to require DC master trust and group personal pension default funds to hold minimum shares, capped at 10% (with up to 5% in UK assets), in private equity, venture capital, private credit, land, infrastructure and unlisted equity. The power is not yet in force: it starts on a date set by commencement regulations, no regulations under it may be made before 1 January 2028, it lapses if not brought into force by the end of 2032, and is repealed at the end of 2035.

    Why it counts: It lets the state direct workers' pension savings into chosen asset classes and UK investment rather than leaving allocation to trustees.

  • FSMA cryptoasset regime: FCA authorisation required, including for overseas platforms serving UK consumers

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Feb 4, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 4.8 points once it applies

    The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) Regulations 2026, made on 4 February 2026, turn operating a crypto trading platform, dealing, arranging, custody, staking and issuing sterling stablecoins from the UK into FCA-authorised activities from 25 October 2027. An overseas firm that sells or buys crypto directly with a UK retail consumer is treated as carrying on the activity in the UK, so it needs UK authorisation unless an FCA-authorised UK platform or intermediary stands between it and the consumer. The FCA's final rules (policy statements PS26/9 to PS26/13, June 2026) apply from the same date.

    Why it counts: Unauthorised foreign exchanges lose lawful direct access to UK savers and must route through licensed UK intermediaries, which bring UK conduct, appropriateness and reporting rules with them; this narrows the offshore channel for moving savings into crypto.

Proposed (1)

  • Bank of England systemic stablecoin regime: 70% gilts / 30% unremunerated BoE deposits, GBP 40bn issuance cap, no interest

    Proposed
    Since
    Jun 22, 2026
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    The Bank of England's draft Code of Practice for sterling systemic stablecoins (policy statement of 22 June 2026, consultation closed 22 September 2026) requires backing of 70% short-term UK government debt (maturity up to 6 months) and 30% unremunerated Bank of England deposits, bars issuers from paying interest to coinholders, and caps each systemic stablecoin at GBP 40 billion of issuance as a temporary guardrail. It replaces the per-coin holding limits of GBP 20,000 for individuals and GBP 10 million for businesses proposed in November 2025; the Bank intends to finalise the Code by end-2026 so regulated stablecoins can operate from 2027.

    Why it counts: Systemic stablecoins must recycle 70% of their reserves into short-dated gilts and lend the rest to the central bank interest-free, cannot pass any yield to holders, and are capped in aggregate size to protect bank deposit funding - so they cannot become a yield-bearing alternative to deposits and gilts.

Under discussion (1)

  • Digital pound design: GBP 10,000-20,000 individual holding limit and no interest

    Under discussion
    Since
    Feb 7, 2023
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    The Bank of England and HM Treasury's digital pound proposals (consultation of 7 February 2023, response of 25 January 2024) envisage a retail CBDC that pays no interest and whose individual holdings would be capped, initially in the range of GBP 10,000 to GBP 20,000, with higher limits for corporates. The project is still in its design phase; the Bank says no decision to issue has been made and a decision on next steps is due in 2026, with any launch requiring primary legislation.

    Why it counts: A capped, zero-interest state digital currency cannot serve as a store of value competing with bank deposits, so households keep savings in the bank system that funds government debt; the Bank's own modelling ties the cap to limiting deposit outflows.

Repealed (1)

  • Bank of England emergency long-gilt purchases (2022)

    Repealed
    Since
    Sep 28, 2022
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    During the LDI crisis the Bank bought long-dated gilts from 28 September to 14 October 2022, offering up to GBP 5 billion a day (raised to GBP 10 billion in the final week, when index-linked gilts were added). It bought GBP 19.3 billion in total, which was sold back by 12 January 2023.

    Why it counts: It showed the central bank will step in to cap gilt yields when pension funds are forced sellers.

Before today

12 examples from United Kingdom in the toolkit, past and present, grouped by what the tool does. Each links to the instrument, its other examples and the cited law.

SteerSteer savings to the state

HoldHold the price of money down

BlockBlock the exits

Further reading

  • ‘Muddling through or tunnelling through?’ UK monetary and fiscal exceptionalism and the Great Inflation

    Bordo, Bush, Thomas · Bank of England, 2025

    Reassesses British inflation through the interaction of fiscal policy, debt management and monetary institutions. Its historical account shows how efforts to fund government cheaply and limits on gilt sales pushed financing into the banking system, while later fiscal regime changes helped contain inflation.

  • Monetisation: Do not panic

    Pisani-Ferry, Blanchard · CEPR, 2020

    Argues, from the April 2020 perspective, that pandemic bond purchases did not themselves establish fiscal dominance or inevitable inflation. Whether central banks later raise rates and remunerate reserves matters more than the initial scale of purchases.

  • Financial Repression: Evidence and Theory

    Chari, Dovis, Kehoe · Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2016

    Explains how compulsory bank holdings can strengthen a government’s commitment to repay by making default more costly. The model supports repression only under urgent financing needs and weak repayment credibility, because the benefit comes at the expense of productive private investment.

  • The Liquidation of Government Debt

    Reinhart, Sbrancia · IMF, 2015

    Reconstructs government debt portfolios to measure the transfer from savers to governments when controlled interest rates combine with inflation. It finds substantial postwar debt liquidation and explains why high debt after the global financial crisis could revive these policies.

  • Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt

    Arslanalp, Tsuda · IMF, 2012

    Builds comparable sovereign-debt holdings by investor group and introduces indicators of exposure to investor withdrawals. It documents increased bank exposure to home-country government debt after 2008, providing data for studying captive demand without assuming every domestic holding is coerced.

  • Financial repression: Then and now

    Reinhart, Kirkegaard · CEPR, 2012

    Documents the post-2008 return of negative real rates and policies that encourage domestic institutions to absorb public debt. The authors interpret preferential regulatory treatment, pension restrictions and deposit-rate limits as possible modern forms of repression.