Financial Repression Tracker

Rules that steer savings into government debt or hold returns below inflation, country by country.

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China

China combines guided deposit-rate ceilings, tight capital controls and state direction of credit, which keep household savings onshore at low yields. Recent moves include record-low deposit rates (2025), a 10 trillion yuan local-debt swap, resumed PBOC bond trading, larger relending quotas and a wider crypto and stablecoin ban, while property curbs and some tax privileges for bonds have been eased.

Repression index
59.5 / 100
  • 18 in force
  • 0 enacted
  • 1 proposed or under discussion

Measures as of

How the index is built

Each segment is what one category of rules, or the market pillar, adds to the index. The full bar is 100.

  • Captive demand 8.0
  • Central bank financing 6.4
  • Capital controls 12.4
  • Rate caps 9.5
  • Prudential sovereign bias 0.0
  • Directed credit 6.5
  • Tax incentives 1.4
  • Real asset restrictions 4.3
  • Transaction taxes 1.0
  • Market pillar 10.0

Index = 80% × rules (61.9) + 20% × market (50.0) = 59.5

The method in plain words
  • Rules pillar (0–100). Each of the 9 categories can add up to its weight (the weights sum to 100). A category's intensity grows with every in-force measure in it: one measure counts by its severity factor (0.25 for severity 1, 0.5 for 2, 0.8 for 3), and each further measure closes part of the remaining gap, so breadth adds with diminishing returns: two severity-3 measures give 96%.
  • Market pillar (0–100). The average of the market readings below: how negative the real policy rate is, and how much of the government's debt is held by its own central bank and banks.
  • Index. 80% rules + 20% market when market data exists, otherwise rules alone. Laws passed but not yet applying count only in the outlook; proposals never count.

The 9 categories

Weight = the most points a category can add to the rules pillar. Intensity = how much of that weight the in-force measures fill. Open a category to see the measures counted; “What is this?” shows the instruments behind it, worldwide and in history.

  • Weight 16Intensity 63%Points 8.0

    Mandated holdings of government debt by pension funds, insurers or banks. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 50%Points 6.4

    Central bank purchases of government debt, yield curve control, direct monetary financing. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 97%Points 12.4

    Limits on moving money abroad, outbound investment limits, FX controls. What is this? →

  • 1 proposed not countedWeight 14Intensity 85%Points 9.5

    Caps or ceilings on deposit or lending rates, and administered interest rates. What is this? →

  • Prudential sovereign biasWeight 10Intensity 0%Points 0.0

    Prudential rules that favor sovereign debt (zero risk weights, liquidity-buffer rules, leverage-ratio exemptions). No in-force measures here. What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 81%Points 6.5

    State-directed lending, credit guidance, and mandates to invest domestically or in state priorities. What is this? →

  • Weight 7Intensity 25%Points 1.4

    Tax privileges for government bonds, or tax penalties on competing assets. What is this? →

  • Weight 6Intensity 89%Points 4.3

    Rent controls, property curbs, and limits on owning gold, cash or crypto. What is this? →

  • Weight 5Intensity 25%Points 1.0

    Financial transaction taxes, stamp duties and similar levies on non-government assets. What is this? →

Market pillar 50.0 / 100

The average of the readings that have data, worth 20% of the index (10.0 points here).

Indicators

Measured data from international sources, alongside the rules above. Real rates below zero mean savers lose purchasing power.

Real policy rate
2.2%
Aug 2026
Government debt
99% of GDP
2025
Liquidation effect (est.)
None
real rates are positive
Debt held by central bank
2.2%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic banks
87.5%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic non-banks
8.1%
Q4 2025
Debt held by foreign holders
2.2%
Q4 2025
Capital account openness
0.16 of 1
2023

Policy rate, inflation and real rate

Negative real rates-20246810200520102015202020253.02.20.8

Who holds government debt

0204060801002005201020152020202587.58.12.22.2

The liquidation effect follows Reinhart and Sbrancia: with a negative real rate, about −(real rate × debt) of GDP moves from savers to the state each year. It uses the policy rate, so treat it as a rough guide. Sources: BIS, BIS central bank policy rates; BIS consumer prices; IMF, IMF DataMapper: World Economic Outlook (October 2026); Fiscal Monitor (October 2026); Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito, The Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN): a de jure measure of financial openness; IMF, Sovereign Debt Investor Base for Advanced Economies / for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda).

Measures

Every measure tracked here, with its legal basis and sources. Only in-force measures count in the index.

In force (18)

  • Ban on unapproved offshore yuan stablecoins and offshore crypto issuance by mainland firms

    In force
    Since
    Feb 6, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.0 points to the index

    Without approval from the relevant authorities, no one in China or abroad may issue a yuan-linked stablecoin offshore. Mainland entities, and the offshore entities they control, may not issue virtual currencies abroad without approval. The notice says fiat-linked stablecoins in effect take on part of the functions of legal tender.

    Why it counts: It keeps yuan payment and savings functions inside the state-controlled banking system and the e-CNY, and blocks an offshore yuan token that could move money around the FX quota and capital controls.

  • Ban on onshore asset tokenisation and CSRC filing for offshore tokens backed by mainland assets

    In force
    Since
    Feb 6, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.4 points to the index

    Tokenising real-world assets (turning ownership or income rights into tokens and issuing or trading them) is banned inside mainland China, except for business approved by the competent authority on designated financial infrastructure. Foreign providers may not offer tokenisation services to mainland entities, and banks, payment firms and intermediaries may not serve unapproved projects. Investments in real-world-asset tokens that offend public order and good morals are void in civil law. Offshore tokenisation based on mainland assets or rights needs approval or filing; for asset-backed security tokens, the mainland entity controlling the assets must first file with the CSRC (CSRC Announcement [2026] No. 1, in force 6 February 2026), which can refuse the filing, and some issuers and assets are barred outright.

    Why it counts: It stops onshore assets and savings being wrapped into freely tradable tokens that could move across the border outside FX and capital-account controls, and keeps any such issuance under case-by-case state approval.

  • PBOC open-market trading of government bonds

    In force
    Since
    Oct 2025
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 6.4 points to the index

    The PBOC resumed buying government bonds in October 2025 after a pause earlier that year, and says it now runs these operations routinely. Net injections through government bond trading reached 300 billion yuan in the first half of 2026.

    Why it counts: Central bank purchases add a large, price-insensitive buyer of government debt and help hold down yields.

  • Tax treatment of government bond interest (VAT exemption narrowed)

    In force
    Since
    Aug 8, 2025
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.4 points to the index

    Interest on central and local government bonds has long been exempt from income tax and VAT. From 8 August 2025, VAT applies to interest on newly issued treasury, local government and financial bonds; bonds issued before then (including later reopenings) keep the exemption until maturity, and the exemption for foreign institutional investors was extended to end-2027.

    Why it counts: Tax exemptions raise the after-tax yield of government bonds against loans and corporate bonds; the 2025 change trims this edge for new issues.

  • Deposit-rate guidance through the self-discipline mechanism

    In force
    Since
    May 20, 2025
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Adds 8.1 points to the index

    Deposit rates are formally liberalized, but banks set them under a PBOC-overseen self-discipline mechanism and official guidance that sets ceilings. In May 2025 the big state banks cut the one-year deposit rate to 0.95%, the first time below 1%, and demand deposits to 0.05%.

    Why it counts: Coordinated deposit ceilings keep savers' returns low to protect bank margins and cheapen credit to the state and firms.

  • State 'national team' stock purchases

    In force
    Since
    Apr 7, 2025
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.1 points to the index

    Central Huijin, a sovereign fund unit, said in April 2025 it would act as a quasi-stabilization fund buying ETFs, and the PBOC pledged relending support if needed, alongside other state investors. Reports in early 2026 said it trimmed some holdings to cool the market.

    Why it counts: State-directed funds and central bank liquidity are used to steer asset prices, putting policy goals ahead of market pricing for domestic savers.

  • Guidance for state insurers to put 30% of new premiums into A-shares

    In force
    Since
    Jan 22, 2025
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.7 points to the index

    A January 2025 multi-agency plan steers large state-owned insurers to raise their A-share investment and puts state insurers on performance reviews of at least three years. Regulators said the aim is for large state insurers to invest 30% of new annual premiums in A-shares from 2025.

    Why it counts: Policyholders' savings are directed into domestic equities to meet a policy goal rather than by the insurer's own choice of assets.

  • Banks must flag crypto-linked cross-border transactions and may cut off clients' FX access

    In force
    Since
    Dec 27, 2024
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.0 points to the index

    Under SAFE measures (Huifa [2024] No. 32), published and in force from 27 December 2024, banks must monitor and report to SAFE, within 5 working days of confirming them, foreign-exchange 'risk transactions', which expressly include illegal cross-border financial activity involving virtual currencies. Banks must take measures against the client proportionate to the risk, which can include raising its risk rating, enhanced review, refusing or ending FX business, or limiting the amount, number and type of non-face-to-face FX transactions.

    Why it counts: It targets the use of crypto (for example buying USDT with yuan and selling it abroad for dollars) to get around the annual FX quota and capital controls, with loss of FX banking access as the penalty.

  • 10 trillion yuan local hidden-debt swap

    In force
    Since
    Nov 8, 2024
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 5.7 points to the index

    In November 2024 the NPC Standing Committee approved a 6 trillion yuan increase in local special-bond quotas over 2024-2026, plus 4 trillion yuan of existing quota over five years, to swap off-budget local government financing vehicle debt into official bonds. Commercial banks are the main buyers of these bonds.

    Why it counts: Higher-yield LGFV loans held by banks are replaced with lower-yield government bonds, shifting the cost of local debt onto bank balance sheets and, through margins, savers.

  • Caps on interbank and non-bank deposit rates

    In force
    Since
    Nov 2024
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.4 points to the index

    In November 2024 the self-discipline mechanism told banks, from 1 December, to price demand deposits from non-bank financial institutions off the 7-day reverse repo rate (the excess-reserve rate for financial-infrastructure institutions). Banks must now keep the weighted rate on these deposits at no more than about 1.4%.

    Why it counts: Capping what banks pay asset managers and other institutions holds down returns on cash held through funds and wealth products.

  • PBOC relending quotas for priority sectors

    In force
    Since
    2024
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.7 points to the index

    The PBOC provides cheap relending to banks tied to loans for state priorities. In September 2026 it raised the sci-tech relending quota to 1.4 trillion yuan, added 500 billion yuan for agriculture and small firms, and lifted the private-enterprise facility to 1.3 trillion yuan.

    Why it counts: Central bank funding steers bank credit toward sectors the state picks, at rates set by policy rather than by savers' returns.

  • Stamp duty on stock sales

    In force
    Since
    Aug 28, 2023
    Category
    Transaction taxes
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.0 points to the index

    Sellers of A-shares pay stamp duty on each trade. The rate was halved from 0.1% to 0.05% from 28 August 2023, and the cut also covers northbound Stock Connect trades.

    Why it counts: A tax on equity trades, which government bonds do not bear, lowers net returns on stocks relative to bonds and deposits.

  • Ban on crypto trading, exchanges and offshore platforms serving mainland residents

    In force
    Since
    Sep 15, 2021
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Adds 3.1 points to the index

    All crypto business in mainland China is illegal: fiat-to-crypto and crypto-to-crypto exchange, acting as central counterparty in crypto trades, information and pricing services, token offerings and trading of crypto financial products. Foreign providers may not serve mainland entities, and banks and payment firms may not open accounts, move funds or clear payments for crypto business. Investments in crypto that offend public order and good morals are void in civil law and losses fall on the investor. Holding crypto is not itself expressly prohibited. The comprehensive ban dates from the ten-agency notice of 15 September 2021; the current basis is the eight-agency notice of 6 February 2026, which repealed and replaced it.

    Why it counts: Savers cannot legally buy bitcoin or stablecoins through any onshore or foreign exchange, and the payment rails are closed to it. This removes crypto as a route out of low-yield yuan deposits and around the FX quota.

  • Crypto mining ban (eliminated industry)

    In force
    Since
    Sep 3, 2021
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.6 points to the index

    An eleven-agency NDRC notice of September 2021 bans new crypto-mining projects, orders existing ones phased out, bars grid connections and financial or tax support for miners, and applies a surcharge of 0.30 yuan per kWh to mining power use. Mining is listed as an 'eliminated' industry in the 2024 Industrial Structure Adjustment Catalogue, and the February 2026 notice tells provinces to shut remaining mining and bars mining-rig makers from selling in China.

    Why it counts: Officially an energy-saving and carbon measure, it also closes the onshore route to acquiring crypto without an exchange: mining projects lose power, finance and tax support, so domestic savings and power cannot readily be turned into crypto.

  • e-CNY wallet tiers with balance and transaction caps; interest tied to deposit-rate self-discipline

    In force
    Since
    Jul 2021
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.3 points to the index

    The PBOC's July 2021 e-CNY white paper describes digital-yuan wallets tiered by identity verification, each with its own per-transaction, daily and balance limits set by the operating institutions; the default wallet is anonymous and has the lowest limits. The PBOC says the tiering and caps exist to steer e-CNY to retail payments and limit the crowding-out of bank deposits; at the time e-CNY paid no interest. According to a Xinhua report of 29 December 2025 on a PBOC action plan, from 1 January 2026 e-CNY in bank wallets is a bank liability: banks pay interest on real-name wallet balances under the deposit-rate pricing self-discipline agreements, and the balances count toward the reserve-requirement base. No official page found gives the current tier amounts.

    Why it counts: The state's own digital money is designed not to compete with bank deposits: anonymous holdings are capped, and since 2026 the interest on real-name wallets follows the same deposit-rate self-discipline pricing as bank deposits, so it offers no escape from low deposit rates.

  • Home purchase restrictions in first-tier cities (being eased)

    In force
    Since
    2010
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 0.6 points to the index

    Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen still limit how many homes residents and non-locals may buy, though they loosened rules in 2026: Shanghai in February, Shenzhen in April and Beijing in August. Guangzhou scrapped all home-purchase limits from 30 September 2024, and more than 20 other cities have lifted curbs entirely.

    Why it counts: Limits on buying property restrict one of the few large onshore alternatives to bank deposits.

  • $50,000 annual FX purchase quota for individuals

    In force
    Since
    2007
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    3 of 3

    Adds 5.6 points to the index

    Individuals may buy up to the equivalent of $50,000 of foreign currency a year with just their ID under SAFE rules; larger current-account purchases need supporting documents. Since 2017 buyers must declare the purpose, and the allowance may not be used for overseas property, securities or investment-type insurance.

    Why it counts: Household savings are largely trapped onshore, so they flow to low-yield bank deposits, domestic property and government-influenced assets.

  • QDII quotas on outbound portfolio investment

    In force
    Since
    2006
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.4 points to the index

    Domestic investors can buy foreign securities through funds and institutions only within quotas granted by SAFE. Quotas were expanded in 2026, reaching about $176 billion by mid-year, with a further batch in August.

    Why it counts: Rationed access to foreign assets limits savers' ability to seek higher returns abroad and keeps capital in domestic markets.

Under discussion (1)

  • Tighter curbs on non-bank demand deposit pricing

    Under discussion
    Since
    Mar 2026
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Not counted in the index

    In March 2026 Caixin reported that the banking industry may tighten self-regulatory controls on demand deposits from non-bank financial institutions after banks found ways around existing caps.

    Why it counts: Closing loopholes would further limit the yield that money funds and wealth products, and so their retail investors, can earn on cash.

Before today

9 examples from China in the toolkit, past and present, grouped by what the tool does. Each links to the instrument, its other examples and the cited law.

HoldHold the price of money down

BlockBlock the exits

Further reading

  • Interest-Rate Liberalization and Capital Misallocations

    Liu, Wang, Xu · Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2020

    Shows that removing interest-rate restrictions can improve allocation within Chinese state-owned and private sectors while worsening allocation between them. In the calibrated model, liberalization can reduce welfare unless reforms also address state-owned firms’ advantages and private firms’ credit constraints.

  • Tracking Global Demand for Emerging Market Sovereign Debt

    Arslanalp, Tsuda · IMF, 2014

    Extends sovereign investor-base measurement to emerging markets, separating domestic banks, nonbanks and central banks from foreign holders. It documents post-crisis foreign inflows and country differences in banks’ government-debt exposure, useful for evaluating funding dependence and potential captive demand.

  • Interest Rate Liberalization in China

    Feyzioglu, Porter, Takáts · IMF, 2009

    Identifies the deposit-rate ceiling as China’s most binding interest-rate restriction and models its removal. Liberalization can improve credit allocation and monetary transmission, but successful implementation also requires stronger supervision and governance.