Financial Repression Tracker

Rules that steer savings into government debt or hold returns below inflation, country by country.

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Thailand

Thailand's financial repression runs mainly through state banks and fiscal channels rather than open monetary financing: the government has state-owned banks such as BAAC run programmes it repays later under Section 28 of the fiscal discipline law, with arrears of THB 1,133,751 million (30.21% of the budget, against a 32% ceiling) at the end of fiscal 2025, and savings lotteries and savings deposits at these banks earn tax-free returns. Banks pay a levy of 0.46% a year on deposits to repay the FIDF's crisis losses, hold baht government debt at a 0% risk weight, and the Social Security Fund must keep at least 60% in high-security assets. Exchange controls are being eased to weaken the baht, with the repatriation threshold raised to USD 10 million in January 2026, but direct retail investment abroad is capped at USD 5 million a year and online gold trades settled in baht are capped at THB 50 million a day. Crypto is kept onshore: unlicensed foreign exchanges were blocked in 2025, crypto payments are banned, and gains are tax-exempt only on Thai-licensed venues until 2029.

Repression index
43.6 / 100
  • 12 in force
  • 0 enacted
  • 0 proposed or under discussion

Measures as of

How the index is built

Each segment is what one category of rules, or the market pillar, adds to the index. The full bar is 100.

  • Captive demand 3.2
  • Central bank financing 0.0
  • Capital controls 9.2
  • Rate caps 2.8
  • Prudential sovereign bias 4.0
  • Directed credit 4.0
  • Tax incentives 2.5
  • Real asset restrictions 2.1
  • Transaction taxes 2.0
  • Market pillar 13.9

Index = 80% × rules (37.2) + 20% × market (69.4) = 43.6

The method in plain words
  • Rules pillar (0–100). Each of the 9 categories can add up to its weight (the weights sum to 100). A category's intensity grows with every in-force measure in it: one measure counts by its severity factor (0.25 for severity 1, 0.5 for 2, 0.8 for 3), and each further measure closes part of the remaining gap, so breadth adds with diminishing returns: two severity-3 measures give 96%.
  • Market pillar (0–100). The average of the market readings below: how negative the real policy rate is, and how much of the government's debt is held by its own central bank and banks.
  • Index. 80% rules + 20% market when market data exists, otherwise rules alone. Laws passed but not yet applying count only in the outlook; proposals never count.

The 9 categories

Weight = the most points a category can add to the rules pillar. Intensity = how much of that weight the in-force measures fill. Open a category to see the measures counted; “What is this?” shows the instruments behind it, worldwide and in history.

  • Weight 16Intensity 25%Points 3.2

    Mandated holdings of government debt by pension funds, insurers or banks. What is this? →

  • Central bank financingWeight 16Intensity 0%Points 0.0

    Central bank purchases of government debt, yield curve control, direct monetary financing. No in-force measures here. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 72%Points 9.2

    Limits on moving money abroad, outbound investment limits, FX controls. What is this? →

  • Weight 14Intensity 25%Points 2.8

    Caps or ceilings on deposit or lending rates, and administered interest rates. What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 50%Points 4.0

    Prudential rules that favor sovereign debt (zero risk weights, liquidity-buffer rules, leverage-ratio exemptions). What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 50%Points 4.0

    State-directed lending, credit guidance, and mandates to invest domestically or in state priorities. What is this? →

  • Weight 7Intensity 44%Points 2.5

    Tax privileges for government bonds, or tax penalties on competing assets. What is this? →

  • Weight 6Intensity 44%Points 2.1

    Rent controls, property curbs, and limits on owning gold, cash or crypto. What is this? →

  • Weight 5Intensity 50%Points 2.0

    Financial transaction taxes, stamp duties and similar levies on non-government assets. What is this? →

Market pillar 69.4 / 100

The average of the readings that have data, worth 20% of the index (13.9 points here).

Indicators

Measured data from international sources, alongside the rules above. Real rates below zero mean savers lose purchasing power.

Real policy rate
-1.5%
Aug 2026
Government debt
65% of GDP
2025
Liquidation effect (est.)
None
real rates are positive
Debt held by central bank
4.1%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic banks
49.2%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic non-banks
38.1%
Q4 2025
Debt held by foreign holders
8.7%
Q4 2025
Capital account openness
0.42 of 1
2023

Policy rate, inflation and real rate

Negative real rates-10-50510200520102015202020252.51.0-1.5

Who holds government debt

01020304050602005201020152020202549.238.18.74.1

The liquidation effect follows Reinhart and Sbrancia: with a negative real rate, about −(real rate × debt) of GDP moves from savers to the state each year. It uses the policy rate, so treat it as a rough guide. Sources: BIS, BIS central bank policy rates; BIS consumer prices; IMF, IMF DataMapper: World Economic Outlook (October 2026); Fiscal Monitor (October 2026); Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito, The Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN): a de jure measure of financial openness; IMF, Sovereign Debt Investor Base for Advanced Economies / for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda).

Measures

Every measure tracked here, with its legal basis and sources. Only in-force measures count in the index.

In force (12)

  • Cap of THB 50 million a day on baht-settled online gold trades

    In force
    Since
    Mar 1, 2026
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.1 points to the index

    From 1 March 2026, purchases or sales of gold on online platforms settled in baht are capped at THB 50 million per side, per person, per day, per platform; larger trades need approval from the exchange control officer. All platform trades must be paid electronically from the client's own account, in full (no net settlement) and without short selling. Dollar-settled trades, gold shops, buy-only savings platforms and TFEX are excluded.

    Why it counts: The cap and settlement rules limit large-scale use of gold as a liquid savings and speculative asset in baht; the stated aim is to curb baht volatility caused by gold-related FX flows.

  • Repatriation of foreign-currency income above USD 10 million

    In force
    Since
    Jan 20, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.1 points to the index

    Residents who receive foreign currency from abroad must bring it back within 360 days and sell it to an authorised bank or deposit it in a foreign-currency account with an authorised bank in Thailand, unless the amount is below a threshold. In January 2026 the threshold was raised from USD 1 million to USD 10 million per transaction, both for export proceeds (Ministry of Finance exchange-control notification No. 11, in force 20 January 2026) and for other foreign income (Competent Officer notification No. 35); it had been USD 200,000 until March 2020.

    Why it counts: Large export and other foreign earnings cannot be kept offshore indefinitely, which keeps residents' foreign-currency savings inside the Thai banking system; successive increases in the threshold have made the rule narrow.

  • Blocking of unlicensed foreign crypto exchanges and BOT approval for crypto payments abroad

    In force
    Since
    Jun 28, 2025
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 5.0 points to the index

    Only SEC-licensed digital asset businesses may serve Thai residents. In June 2025 the SEC asked the digital economy ministry to block unlicensed platforms, and Bybit, 1000X, CoinEx, OKX and XT.COM were blocked from 28 June 2025. Under exchange control rules, foreign currency may be bought to pay non-residents for digital assets only by mutual funds and private funds; other residents need prior approval from the Bank of Thailand's exchange control officer.

    Why it counts: Residents cannot freely move baht or foreign currency to offshore crypto venues, so crypto savings stay on domestic licensed platforms inside the Thai regulatory and tax net.

  • Crypto gains tax-exempt only on Thai-licensed exchanges, brokers and dealers (2025-2029)

    In force
    Since
    Jan 1, 2025
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.2 points to the index

    Ministerial Regulation No. 399 (published 5 September 2025) exempts from personal income tax gains on transfers of cryptocurrencies or digital tokens made on, through or to Thai-licensed digital asset exchanges, brokers and dealers, for income received from 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2029. Gains realised elsewhere, including on foreign platforms, get no such exemption.

    Why it counts: A tax wedge in favour of domestic licensed venues pulls crypto savings onshore, where they are supervised and cannot easily leave, and penalises use of offshore platforms.

  • Ban on crypto businesses facilitating payments in digital assets

    In force
    Since
    Apr 1, 2022
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.1 points to the index

    Since 1 April 2022, licensed digital asset businesses may not offer or promote the use of cryptocurrencies or digital tokens as a means of payment for goods and services, and must warn and suspend clients who use trading accounts for payments.

    Why it counts: Crypto is confined to an investment asset and cannot develop into a parallel means of payment that would let savers bypass the baht and the domestic banking system.

  • Interest-rate ceilings on credit cards (16%) and personal loans (25%)

    In force
    Since
    Jul 31, 2020
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.8 points to the index

    Interest, fees and penalties on credit cards may not exceed 16% a year (effective rate) under BOT Notification SorNorSor. 11/2563, and on regulated unsecured personal loans 25% a year on a reducing-balance basis.

    Why it counts: Administered ceilings hold down the price of consumer credit; they mainly shift returns from lenders to borrowers rather than taxing savers directly.

  • Limits on residents' direct portfolio investment, gifts and banknotes taken abroad

    In force
    Since
    Nov 8, 2019
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.1 points to the index

    Thai individuals and non-institutional firms may send at most USD 5 million per person per year abroad for portfolio investment made directly rather than through onshore agents (investment through Thai securities firms, banks and funds is unlimited but subject to SEC rules). Gifts to persons abroad are capped at USD 200,000 per person per year (USD 50,000 before an amendment in force from late 2025), and baht banknotes taken out of the country are limited to THB 50,000 (THB 2 million to neighbouring countries, Vietnam and Yunnan).

    Why it counts: Direct exit by retail savers is capped and channelled through domestic intermediaries that the authorities supervise, which keeps most resident savings onshore or under Thai control.

  • Quasi-fiscal programmes run through state banks (Section 28, ceiling 32% of the budget)

    In force
    Since
    Apr 2018
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.0 points to the index

    Under Section 28 of the State Fiscal and Financial Disciplines Act 2018, the cabinet can entrust state agencies, mainly the state-owned specialised financial institutions, with programmes whose costs or lost revenue the government repays later. The outstanding amount owed must not exceed 32% of the annual budget (from 3 October 2022). At the end of fiscal 2025 it stood at THB 1,133,751 million, 30.21% of the budget, of which THB 826,862 million was owed to the agricultural bank BAAC.

    Why it counts: State banks lend or pay out on government instructions using depositors' money and are repaid from future budgets, an off-budget channel that directs savings to state priorities.

  • Zero risk weight and Level 1 liquid-asset status for baht government debt

    In force
    Since
    Jan 1, 2016
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 4.0 points to the index

    Commercial banks assign a 0% risk weight to baht claims on the Thai government and the Bank of Thailand (including the FIDF and the Deposit Protection Agency) up to the amount of their baht liabilities. Debt issued or guaranteed by the sovereign, the central bank, state agencies and state enterprises with a 0% risk weight counts as Level 1 high-quality liquid assets under the liquidity coverage ratio, which applies from 1 January 2016.

    Why it counts: Government and central-bank paper costs banks no capital and fully meets the liquidity requirement, which makes it the default home for deposit funding.

  • Social Security Fund: at least 60% in high-security assets

    In force
    Since
    2016
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 3.2 points to the index

    The Social Security Fund must invest at least 60% of its assets in high-security assets and at most 40% in risk assets, under a 2016 Social Security Board regulation; a separate board notification caps foreign investment at 47% of the fund. At 30 June 2026 the fund held THB 3,041,974 million, of which 42.23% was in government, Bank of Thailand and Finance Ministry-guaranteed state-enterprise bonds.

    Why it counts: Mandatory contributions of private-sector workers are pooled in a fund whose rules favour government and state-guaranteed paper, providing a large captive buyer for public debt.

  • Deposit levy to repay the FIDF's crisis losses

    In force
    Since
    May 2012
    Category
    Transaction taxes
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.0 points to the index

    Financial institutions pay an annual contribution of 0.46% of their average baht deposit base into an account that repays the loans used to cover the Financial Institutions Development Fund's crisis losses. In 2026 the Bank of Thailand reduced what goes to that account and banks are using FIDF contributions to share credit risk on new SME loans.

    Why it counts: A levy on deposits services state-assumed crisis debt, lowering the interest banks can pay depositors, and part of it is now steered into state-chosen lending.

  • Tax-free interest and prizes on state-bank savings lotteries (GSB, BAAC, GH Bank)

    In force
    Since
    Nov 7, 1991
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.2 points to the index

    Interest on Government Savings Bank savings lottery bonds and on GSB demand deposits, and GSB savings-lottery prizes, are exempt from income tax under Section 42 of the Revenue Code. Under Ministerial Regulation No. 126, interest and prizes on BAAC and GH Bank savings lotteries, and interest on BAAC and GH Bank savings deposits, are also exempt without limit. By contrast, the statutory exemption for commercial-bank savings interest is capped (THB 10,000 a year in Section 42(8)(c)).

    Why it counts: Tax-free returns draw household savings into state-owned banks, which fund government programmes and carry most of the Section 28 quasi-fiscal debt.

Before today

The toolkit has no examples from Thailand yet.