Financial Repression Tracker

Rules that steer savings into government debt or hold returns below inflation, country by country.

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Brazil

Brazil's financial repression runs mainly through administered returns and earmarked credit: savings deposits earn TR plus 0.5% a month whenever Selic is above 8.5%, the compulsory FGTS workers' fund earns TR plus 3% with an inflation floor set by the Supreme Court in 2024, and both are lent on for housing, with 65% of savings deposits directed to mortgages (rising from 2027 to 100% of the deposits not held as reserve requirements) and 31.5% of demand deposits to rural credit. Income-tax exemptions for savings deposits, housing and farm notes and infrastructure debentures steer savers toward these channels. Banks hold federal debt at a zero risk weight and as Level 1 liquid assets, pension funds may hold unlimited federal bonds but only 10% abroad, and a 2019 law lets the central bank's FX gains be transferred to pay domestic debt when its refinancing is under severe strain, as happened with R$325 billion in 2020. Outflows face a 3.5% IOF tax on most foreign-currency purchases and transfers (1.10% for investment abroad), and since February 2026 crypto transfers abroad and to self-custody wallets fall under FX rules, with banks barred from dealing with unauthorised crypto platforms from 6 November 2026.

Repression index
49.9 / 100
Once enacted laws apply
52.3 (+2.4)
  • 14 in force
  • 1 enacted
  • 0 proposed or under discussion

Measures as of

How the index is built

Each segment is what one category of rules, or the market pillar, adds to the index. The full bar is 100.

  • Captive demand 3.2
  • Central bank financing 3.2
  • Capital controls 8.0
  • Rate caps 9.1
  • Prudential sovereign bias 6.0
  • Directed credit 6.0
  • Tax incentives 2.8
  • Real asset restrictions 1.2
  • Transaction taxes 2.0
  • Market pillar 8.4

Index = 80% × rules (51.9) + 20% × market (41.9) = 49.9

The method in plain words
  • Rules pillar (0–100). Each of the 9 categories can add up to its weight (the weights sum to 100). A category's intensity grows with every in-force measure in it: one measure counts by its severity factor (0.25 for severity 1, 0.5 for 2, 0.8 for 3), and each further measure closes part of the remaining gap, so breadth adds with diminishing returns: two severity-3 measures give 96%.
  • Market pillar (0–100). The average of the market readings below: how negative the real policy rate is, and how much of the government's debt is held by its own central bank and banks.
  • Index. 80% rules + 20% market when market data exists, otherwise rules alone. Laws passed but not yet applying count only in the outlook; proposals never count.

The 9 categories

Weight = the most points a category can add to the rules pillar. Intensity = how much of that weight the in-force measures fill. Open a category to see the measures counted; “What is this?” shows the instruments behind it, worldwide and in history.

  • Weight 16Intensity 25%Points 3.2

    Mandated holdings of government debt by pension funds, insurers or banks. What is this? →

  • Weight 16Intensity 25%Points 3.2

    Central bank purchases of government debt, yield curve control, direct monetary financing. What is this? →

  • 1 enacted not countedWeight 16Intensity 63%Points 8.0 → 10.4 once enacted laws apply

    Limits on moving money abroad, outbound investment limits, FX controls. What is this? →

  • Weight 14Intensity 81%Points 9.1

    Caps or ceilings on deposit or lending rates, and administered interest rates. What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 75%Points 6.0

    Prudential rules that favor sovereign debt (zero risk weights, liquidity-buffer rules, leverage-ratio exemptions). What is this? →

  • Weight 10Intensity 75%Points 6.0

    State-directed lending, credit guidance, and mandates to invest domestically or in state priorities. What is this? →

  • Weight 7Intensity 50%Points 2.8

    Tax privileges for government bonds, or tax penalties on competing assets. What is this? →

  • Weight 6Intensity 25%Points 1.2

    Rent controls, property curbs, and limits on owning gold, cash or crypto. What is this? →

  • Weight 5Intensity 50%Points 2.0

    Financial transaction taxes, stamp duties and similar levies on non-government assets. What is this? →

Market pillar 41.9 / 100

The average of the readings that have data, worth 20% of the index (8.4 points here).

Indicators

Measured data from international sources, alongside the rules above. Real rates below zero mean savers lose purchasing power.

Real policy rate
9.8%
Aug 2026
Government debt
93% of GDP
2025
Liquidation effect (est.)
None
real rates are positive
Debt held by central bank
24.8%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic banks
25.5%
Q4 2025
Debt held by domestic non-banks
38.5%
Q4 2025
Debt held by foreign holders
11.2%
Q4 2025
Capital account openness
0.16 of 1
2023

Policy rate, inflation and real rate

Negative real rates-50510152025302005201020152020202513.89.84.2

Who holds government debt

510152025303540452005201020152020202538.525.524.811.2

The liquidation effect follows Reinhart and Sbrancia: with a negative real rate, about −(real rate × debt) of GDP moves from savers to the state each year. It uses the policy rate, so treat it as a rough guide. Sources: BIS, BIS central bank policy rates; BIS consumer prices; IMF, IMF DataMapper: World Economic Outlook (October 2026); Fiscal Monitor (October 2026); Menzie D. Chinn and Hiro Ito, The Chinn-Ito Index (KAOPEN): a de jure measure of financial openness; IMF, Sovereign Debt Investor Base for Advanced Economies / for Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (Arslanalp and Tsuda).

Measures

Every measure tracked here, with its legal basis and sources. Only in-force measures count in the index.

In force (14)

  • Crypto transfers abroad and self-custody transfers brought into the FX regime

    In force
    Since
    Feb 2, 2026
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 5.7 points to the index

    Since 2 February 2026, international payments and transfers with crypto-assets, transfers to or from self-custodied wallets, and purchases and sales of fiat-referenced crypto-assets (stablecoins) count as foreign-exchange operations that only institutions authorised for them may carry out. Providers must identify the owners of self-custodied wallets and check where the assets come from and go, and buying or selling crypto-assets against foreign currency is banned. When the counterparty is not an institution authorised to operate in the FX market, an international crypto payment or transfer is limited to US$100,000 if handled by a crypto-asset service company and US$500,000 if handled by an FX broker or dealer. Reporting of these operations to the central bank starts with operations from 3 November 2026.

    Why it counts: Moving savings abroad through crypto-assets now passes through the same licensed, reported FX channel as bank transfers, with a per-operation cap, closing a route around FX rules and the IOF tax.

  • Mandatory rural lending out of demand deposits (recursos obrigatórios)

    In force
    Since
    Jul 2025
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 3.0 points to the index

    Banks must lend 31.5% of their demand-deposit base (the 'recursos obrigatórios' of the Rural Credit Manual, MCR 6-2) as rural credit at controlled rates, with sub-quotas for the Pronamp and Pronaf programmes for medium and family farmers. The CMN raised the share from 30% (plus 1.5% at free rates) for the 2025-26 crop year.

    Why it counts: A fixed slice of deposit funding is pre-committed to state-priority farm lending at regulated rates, so banks cross-subsidise these loans out of depositors' money instead of paying market returns on it.

  • IOF tax on foreign-exchange purchases and transfers abroad

    In force
    Since
    Jun 11, 2025
    Category
    Transaction taxes
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.0 points to the index

    Brazil's tax on financial operations (IOF) charges 3.5% on purchases of foreign cash, international card spending and prepaid travel cards, and on transfers of a resident's funds to accounts abroad; transfers abroad for investment pay 1.10%. Decree 12,499/2025 set these rates; Congress suspended it (Legislative Decree 176/2025), but an injunction of 16 July 2025 by the rapporteur in ADC 96, Justice Alexandre de Moraes, restored it except for the 'risco sacado' supplier-finance provisions; the full court has not yet ruled on the merits.

    Why it counts: A levy on every conversion of reais into foreign currency raises the cost of moving savings out of the domestic financial system and makes foreign assets dearer than domestic ones.

  • Cap on credit-card revolving and instalment interest at 100% of the debt

    In force
    Since
    Jan 3, 2024
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.6 points to the index

    Under the Desenrola law, total interest and charges on revolving credit-card balances and instalment plans for card bills may not exceed the original amount of the debt. The statutory cap applied because banks did not get a self-regulation approved within 90 days; the CMN regulated it in December 2023 and it took effect on 3 January 2024.

    Why it counts: A legal ceiling on what lenders may charge on card debt lowers returns on a large consumer-credit segment, a mild administered-rate intervention.

  • Annual central-bank declaration of assets held abroad (CBE)

    In force
    Since
    Dec 31, 2022
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 2.3 points to the index

    Residents whose assets abroad total US$1,000,000 or more on 31 December must file an annual declaration of Brazilian capital abroad with the central bank, and quarterly declarations once they reach US$100,000,000. Since 2 February 2026 the regime also covers crypto-assets held abroad.

    Why it counts: Reporting with fines for non-filing makes residents' foreign savings visible to the authorities, raising the cost and lowering the privacy of holding wealth outside the domestic system.

  • Zero capital risk weight for exposures to the Union and the central bank

    In force
    Since
    May 12, 2022
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 3.0 points to the index

    Under the standardised approach, banks apply a 0% risk weight to exposures to the federal government (União) and the Banco Central do Brasil. Foreign central governments get 0% only if rated AA- or better and 100% if rated from B- to below BBB-.

    Why it counts: Federal debt needs no capital whatever its rating, while foreign sovereigns carry risk weights of 20% to 150% unless rated AA- or better, so banks' balance sheets are tilted toward domestic government bonds.

  • Pension-fund rules: unlimited federal bonds, 10% cap on foreign assets

    In force
    Since
    Mar 24, 2022
    Category
    Captive demand
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 3.2 points to the index

    Closed pension funds (EFPCs) may hold up to 100% of each plan in domestic federal government securities, while bank-issued and corporate fixed income is limited to 80% and all foreign investments together to 10% of each plan's assets. The CMN revised the rules in March 2025 (Resolution 5,202) without changing these two limits.

    Why it counts: The asymmetric limits make domestic federal debt the only asset pension funds can hold without restriction and keep at least 90% of pension savings at home, sustaining domestic demand for government bonds.

  • Central bank FX profits can be transferred to the Treasury to pay federal debt

    In force
    Since
    Jul 2019
    Category
    Central bank financing
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 3.2 points to the index

    Law 13,820/2019 parks the central bank's foreign-exchange gains in a result reserve, which, with the National Monetary Council's prior authorisation, may be used to pay the domestic federal securities debt (DPMFi) when severe liquidity restrictions significantly affect its refinancing; in August 2020 the CMN authorised the transfer of R$325 billion from this reserve to the Treasury for that purpose. The rest of the central bank's positive results must also be paid to the Treasury and used exclusively to pay the federal securities debt. The law took effect on 1 July 2019.

    Why it counts: Valuation gains on reserves can be turned into Treasury cash to redeem bonds when markets will not roll them over, a quasi-monetary backstop for government debt outside the budget.

  • Savings deposits directed to housing credit at a 12% cost ceiling

    In force
    Since
    Aug 2018
    Category
    Directed credit
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 3.0 points to the index

    Banks in the savings and loan system (SBPE) must apply at least 65% of savings deposits to real-estate financing, at least 80% of which in residential loans, mainly under the Housing Finance System (SFH), whose total cost to the borrower is capped at 12% a year. Under CMN Resolution 5,255 of October 2025, from 1 January 2027 the requirement rises to 100% of savings deposits and new interbank real-estate deposits, net of the savings reserve requirement held at the central bank, which is to be gradually released into housing credit. Banks have asked for a postponement; as of September 2026 no CMN resolution had changed the 2027 date.

    Why it counts: Savers' deposits, which earn an administered return, are pre-committed to subsidised housing loans, so the low deposit rate funds below-market mortgages instead of rewarding savers.

  • Federal government securities count as Level 1 liquid assets in the LCR

    In force
    Since
    Mar 5, 2015
    Category
    Prudential sovereign bias
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 3.0 points to the index

    In the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, Brazilian federal government securities accepted by the central bank in intraday rediscount operations count as Level 1 high-quality liquid assets alongside cash and central-bank reserves, with no cap or weighting factor, unlike Level 2 assets, which are capped at 40% of the buffer. Foreign government securities qualify for Level 1 only if rated AA- or better (or up to local-currency outflows of subsidiaries abroad). New LCR minimums apply from 1 January 2027 (CMN Resolution 5,296/2026); the central bank has yet to reissue the calculation rules.

    Why it counts: Large banks must hold a buffer of liquid assets, and federal bonds are the main eligible asset, which creates steady regulatory demand for government debt.

  • Administered return on savings deposits (poupança)

    In force
    Since
    May 2012
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 3.8 points to the index

    By law, savings deposits (cadernetas de poupança) earn the reference rate TR plus 0.5% a month while the Selic target is above 8.5% a year, or TR plus 70% of the Selic target otherwise. Their income is exempt from personal income tax.

    Why it counts: The legal formula caps the return on the most widely held savings product well below the policy rate whenever Selic is high, while the funds are channelled into regulated housing credit; the tax exemption keeps savers in the product.

  • Income-tax exemption for savings deposits, housing and farm notes, and infrastructure debentures

    In force
    Since
    Dec 2004
    Category
    Tax incentives
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 2.8 points to the index

    Individuals pay no income tax on savings-deposit (poupança) income or on real-estate and agribusiness notes and receivables (LH, LCI, CRI, CDA, WA, CDCA, LCA, CRA); infrastructure and priority-project debentures issued up to 31 December 2030 pay 0% for individuals. Other fixed-income investments are taxed at 22.5% to 15% depending on holding period. Provisional Measure 1,303/2025, which would have taxed real-estate and farm notes at 5%, lapsed on 8 October 2025.

    Why it counts: Exemptions are reserved for instruments whose proceeds must fund housing, agriculture or state-priority infrastructure, steering household savings into credit the state wants to subsidise and away from untargeted investments.

  • FGTS: compulsory workers' fund paid TR plus 3%, floored at inflation

    In force
    Since
    May 11, 1990
    Category
    Rate caps
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Adds 3.8 points to the index

    Employers must pay 8% of each worker's pay into an FGTS account, whose balance is credited with the savings-deposit adjustment (TR) plus 3% a year interest and a share of the fund's profits. In June 2024 the Supreme Court (ADI 5090) kept this formula but ruled that balances must be corrected at least by IPCA inflation, with the fund's Board of Trustees compensating any shortfall.

    Why it counts: A large pool of mandatory worker savings earns an administered return of TR plus 3% a year, floored at inflation only since the 2024 ruling, and is lent out by law for housing, sanitation and urban infrastructure; the floor protects against negative real returns but not against the gap to market yields.

  • Limits on rural land purchases by foreigners and foreign-controlled companies

    In force
    Since
    Oct 7, 1971
    Category
    Real asset restrictions
    Severity
    1 of 3

    Adds 1.2 points to the index

    A foreign individual may not acquire more than 50 modules of rural land, and land owned by foreigners may not exceed a quarter of any municipality's area (40% of that share for any one nationality); larger purchases need authorisation. The law also applies to Brazilian companies majority-owned by foreigners, an interpretation restored by a 2010 Attorney-General opinion and upheld unanimously by the Supreme Court on 23 April 2026 (ADPF 342 and ACO 2,463).

    Why it counts: Caps and approvals on foreign ownership narrow the pool of buyers for farmland, a property curb that keeps rural land in domestic hands.

Enacted, not yet in force (1)

  • Crypto platforms need central-bank authorisation; banks barred from dealing with unauthorised ones

    Enacted, not yet in force
    Since
    Nov 10, 2025
    Category
    Capital controls
    Severity
    2 of 3

    Counts in the outlook only: adds 4.3 points once it applies

    Since 2 February 2026 crypto-asset service providers in Brazil need central-bank authorisation (SPSAVs, or authorised banks and brokers); firms already operating had 270 days to apply and may continue meanwhile, and foreign entities already serving Brazilian clients had 270 days to transfer their operations and clients to an authorised institution. From 6 November 2026, financial and payment institutions may not carry out or enable crypto-asset operations whose counterparties are unauthorised providers.

    Why it counts: Cutting the banking and payment rails to unlicensed and offshore platforms confines residents' crypto holdings to supervised domestic providers, which report to the central bank and fall under the FX rules.

Before today

6 examples from Brazil in the toolkit, past and present, grouped by what the tool does. Each links to the instrument, its other examples and the cited law.

HoldHold the price of money down

BlockBlock the exits

RewriteRewrite the deal in a crisis